the ALTERNATIVE: AN AMERICAN SPECTATOR



Anniversary Issue

Winston S. Churchill

1874-1974

Mencken the Snake
by William H. Nolte

Schlesinger the Brute
by Anthony Harrigan

Magruder the Slob
by Suzanne C. Cox

Podhoretz the Ruffian
by Adam Meyerson

December 1974 • Volume 8, Number 3 • Price (.40)

The Continuing Crisis

THE AUTHOR OF this punctiliously authenticated historical record would like to take this opportunity to thank our Heavenly Prankster for the lush imbecilities bestowed on us this month. You outdid yourself, Old Boy!

■ Not twenty-four hours after the editor of the *Wall Street Journal* wryly inquired as to what manner of man would "go around nailing up posters bragging about his character and integrity," the Prophet of Greenwich Village, wide-eyed Ramsey Clark, popped up with an armful of posters apparently written by his mother. Think of it, the moral energies of the Empire State, produced and directed by a sophomore from Dallas, Texas! And then there is the near voluptuous contretemps of Senator James S. Abourezk, of late a specialist in ethics, morality, and other useful devices. Last June the junior senator from South Dakota harangued the Senate in what he considered a major foreign policy pronunciamento, while the majority of assembled eminences snoozed or gently lofted paper airplanes his way; now it has been revealed by *Human Events* that Mr. Abourezk's elocutions were plagiarized almost verbatim from an old issue of *Commonweal*, which is either a Catholic magazine written for atheists or an atheist magazine written for morons. At any rate such tomfoolery was of a piece with one of the most deliciously ludicrous months ever chronicled in this scholarly report.

■ Senator Edward Kennedy announced his adamant disinterest in the 1976 presidential race, and his wife was arrested for drunken driving. Mr. Nixon left a Long Beach, California hospital where he had been treated for phlebitis and a blood clot on the lung, amid Associated Press reports that he had bullied Dr. Robert Toumajian, a hitherto little-known Armenian doctor. Information is still sketchy, but it seems that the treacherous ex-president was being wheeled out of the hospital by a huge brute of a nurse when he spied Dr. Toumajian and suggested he "open an Armenian restaurant," a cruel indignity recognized by the proud physician for the bigoted "condescension" that it was. Thank God the fourth estate was on the scene. Of such incidents are Woodwards and Bernsteins hatched!

■ At 2 A.M. on October 8th, House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills was showing several foreign guests the beauties of our lovely capital when one of his guests, Mrs. Eduardo (The Argentine Fire Cracker) Battistella, became ill. In the ensuing confusion police mistook the distinguished lawmaker's limousine for a car full of drunks and forced it to the curb. Naturally Mr. Mills had no trouble explaining his difficulty to park police, but Mrs. Battistella was borne off to an insane asylum. Finally the free and prosperous citizens of Communist Cuba got an opportunity to see why the average Yankee always has a smile on his face, when Senators Claiborne Pell (D.–R.I.) and Jacob Javits (R.–N.Y.) began their goodwill tour of Cuba on September 29th, a day Dr. Castro chose to deliver the most anti-American address heard through those palmy parts in five years. For several days the American solons toured fish markets, mule farms, and other backwaters, but the rich merriment of the affair did not end until the two held a madcap press conference back in the States during which Senator Pell broke up the press corps with this beauty: "As far as his [Dr. Castro's] anti-American tone was, it was I think the shortest anti-American speech given. So it may be an intense, virulent speech, but it was short. . . . I think he was personally embarrassed that we should have been in his country on that date." In upstate New York, Mr. Robert Shirley and Miss Linda Ravencourt were married at the Utica Zoo.

■ A Gallup poll showed Governer George Wallace to be the most popular possible Democratic nominee for the presidency, and, while a congressional committee investigated campaign financing of American elections, much was revealed about campaign financing of Chilean elections. It seems the CIA has been active in the political life of that country, and now Mr. Gus Hall, the head of the controversial Communist Party, USA, informs us that the CIA has been active in the cultural life of Moscow, where it has been up to no good. According to Mr. Hall, the CIA actually "staged" that disruptive modern art exhibition that endangered the lives of millions of Muscovites until it was finally dispersed by a phalanx of bulldozers and dump trucks, which fortunately were in the area. As the thoughtful Mr. Hall put it, "One would have to be totally naive indeed not to see the fine hand of the CIA in this affair." And back in the United States, the pollution crisis may be subsiding a bit. Two New York City cab drivers challenged each other to a late-night swimming race across the Hudson River and survived, much to the astonishment of the medical world and of the police, who promptly clapped them into the calaboose. Swimming the Hudson River, it seems, is one of the few criminal offenses left in New York.

■ The great inflation fight continues in Washington where Congress resisted Mr. Ford's proposal for a three-month delay in Federal pay increases, overrode his veto of a railroad retirement bill, and then, just before taking an election break, this patriotic Congress dealt the death blow to "America's number one public enemy." On October 18th, without debate, behind closed doors and without a vote, these doughty representatives of the people increased their incomes by $9,280. They will now receive $25,840 for office expenses, a useful sum for men like Representative Charles E. Wiggins (D.–Calif.) who says that he uses this fund "for paying taxes."

■ Africa remains the showcase of democracy and enlightenment for the world. In Zaire an accommodation has been reached whereby pygmies will continue to serve in the civil service, but those who do must discontinue using their traditional hair dressing, a kind of organic pomade which had caused friction between pygmy civil servants and civil servants from other tribes. Its natural ingredients, mostly clay and animal manure, tended to decompose when worn indoors, disrupting office work and staining government documents. Glorious Chad is going ahead with its Cultural Revolution, despite embarrassment caused by several quitters who, upon being sewn up in official tomtoms and tortured for three weeks, died. President Ngarta Tombalbaye has assured the citizenry—ninety percent of whom are illiterate—that all Chadian males will take part in the traditional Yondo initiation, an advanced program under which all males are marched into the bush for forty-five days of stimulating beatings, burnings, scarrings, sexual indignities, druggings, mock burials, and assorted acts of humiliation. The program of cultural rejuvenation had been objected to by Chad's tiny clique of elites—mostly European-educated doctors, professors, government officials, and bankers—who were not accustomed to wearing loincloths and living under the authority of an official initiator who exacts total obedience while his charges disport in the great out-of-doors. But their claim that the Cultural Revolution is disturbing the country by closing down the university, banks, airlines, government offices, and telephone communication to the outside world for two months per year has been recognized by President Tombalbaye for the feeble alibi that it is.

■ Racial violence continues to plague the United States. In Montgomery, Alabama three heavily armed black men attired in white robes took over WAPX, a Negro radio station, commandeered the microphone, issued a call to revolution, and announced, "This ain't no movie." Boston continued to be the scene of racial disorder as whites from South Boston waxed militant over that city's enlightened busing plans. And just when it seemed the airline highjacking problem had been solved a new kind of hijacking was initiated in New York, where a black man, calling himself "Black Samson" and wearing black boots with pink polka dots, highjacked a fully loaded garbage truck. After terrorizing the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Gotham for hours, he rammed a Transit Authority bus and stuffed several bags of refuse into a parked police vehicle.

■ Nevertheless the most remarkable news of all continued to come from Washington where the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the federal authority in charge of policing safety standards for factories and office buildings, was found guilty of over three hundred violations of its own code. And by the end of the month the Eastern press seemed to be telling Americans that the man whom it has for years extolled as the Republicans' choicest presidential candidate is actually unworthy even to be vice president, and so it goes in America and Africa. □

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The Alternative was founded in 1924 by George Nathan and Truman Newberry over a cheap domestic beer in McSorley's Old Ale House. Originally published on restroom walls, only since 1967 has it come under purview of the Saturday Evening Club which publishes it monthly except July and September. One year subscriptions (ten issues) cost $6.00 and all correspondence (manuscripts, subscriptions, threatening letters, federal grants, etc.) should be sent to The Alternative, *P.O. Box 877, 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, Indiana, 47401, Continental U.S.A.*

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R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Honeyfogling Inflation

Editorial

IT IS WITH A NAGGING sadness that I witness the slow sepulchering of historic England. Sadness because I revere the patrimony that Churchill's island race has bequeathed our civilization, and sadness because the fever that has withered England is but an advanced case of what troubles us. What troubles us are a congeries of pernicious ideas unveiled around the time of the French Revolution and borne into our present time by mountebanks and by those remarkable intellectuals whose earnest endeavors have always placed them in danger of being known to history as lunatics.

In most of the intellectual struggles of the last two or three hundred years these pernicious ideas have at once served as the battle-axes of one side and the laughingstocks of the other side, the civilized side. They have been elucidated and analyzed; they have been exhorted and hooted at. They have wobbled on, and today, after all these years of scholarly disquisition, what these pernicious ideas essentially boil down to is the metaphysical observation that life—that painful sequence of years so unevenly distributed by the Almighty to the likes of Adam, Moses, Jesus Christ, Julius Caesar, Cleatus the Lame, Christopher Columbus, Philip the Mad, George III, Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Janis Joplin, and Richard Nixon—life, can be just a bowl of cherries. That is it! That is the Rousseauian insight! Life can be just a bowl of cherries (*Prunus cerasus*), and if most of our bowls are empty or full of worms it is only because of the foul depradations of civilization and twelve Jewish bankers barricaded somewhere in the Alps. This is the fundamental insight that begleams the eye of every reformer. It is the obsession of every revolutionary. It is the breeding ground for all those pernicious ideas that, in two generations and Winston Churchill notwithstanding, have turned one of history's grandest nations into an Albania.

Now among these pernicious ideas are ideas marked by differing degrees of complexity, stupidity, and peril. To refute them all would demand many acres of print and the counsel of many wise men; to convince the college-educated we might even have to call in a rock singer or a preacher of Eastern gibberish. So I shall focus on merely one of the most annoying of these ideas: to wit, the idea that work is an unnecessary misfortune.

This idea has always been one of the utopians' most reliable pieces of cheese. It often enchants college girls, usually during their *dementia praecox* phase, and it has had a powerful effect on many of the intelligentsia, notwithstanding the fact that as ideas go it is at one with the notion that a horsehair, when placed in a jar, can cure cancer or, for that matter, the idea that gorging oneself with vitamin C will render one invincible to the common cold. The idea that work is unnecessary and unfortunate is, then, absurd. It could be refuted by any bum from skid row, assuming that he could stop laughing at it long enough to impale it with a syllogism. Nonetheless, that it is more robust today than ever before I have no doubt.

Consider the recent series of government-sponsored inflation powwows. They were held all over the Republic, and what they told us about the stewards of our economy was embarrassing. In all their harangues about inflation hardly anyone paused to mention the value of work. Much the opposite, work's uselessness seems to have become a matter of dogma amongst economists like John Kenneth Galbraith, James Tobin, and other members of economics' romantic movement. Many of the businessmen dozing through these inflation powwows seem to take it for granted that work is a discomfiting encumbrance to the modern life style. And many labor leaders are plainly appalled by the injustice of any form of toil whatsoever. After reading the garrulous reports from these hollow confabulations it has become depressingly obvious that very few American policy makers, and not many businessmen or labor leaders, see any value in working for a living. Whether it is because so many of them spend so much of their time talking for a living or because of other more abstruse reasons I cannot be certain, but assuredly very few influential Americans actually believe economic output or living standards depend on anything as mundane as work. This series of economic seminars would have been no more ridiculous had Mr. Ford's economic worthies gotten together and discussed the urgent application of technological improvements to Santa Claus' sleigh.

The riveting fact is that American output per man-hour is now the lowest of any industrial country in the world. We have become a nation that not only does not like to work but does not believe in the usefulness of work. Today the American work ethic is roughly akin to the work ethic of, say, Guatemala, an unfortunate situation, no doubt, and it is a situation that could well evolve into a disaster. For while the average Guatemalan is content to gnaw on roots and to shuffle around his dusty *aldea* in baggy pajamas the Americano, even when he lives in New York City, expects better of life. Though Americans are no longer encouraged to be energetic workers they are still the world's most energetic consumers, and therein reside the ingredients for catastrophe. America can never become a Guatemala, but it might yet go the way of England.

Now that only a handful of American economists, businessmen, and labor leaders have a good word for work strikes me as significant. It tells us something about the low-grade quality of many of our leaders. America is one of the few nations on earth to actually have had a work ethic woven into its national fiber, and most historians and sociologists agree that the American regard for work was one of America's most useful assets in trimming the wilderness and ushering us into the late age of affluence. Further, it is not as though work has been bereft of polemicists in the past. Its American champions were so numerous they became a bore, and its European advocates have been as illustrious and diverse as Voltaire and Carlyle. What is more the common man still realizes work's value, though at times his faith must be sorely tried by yokels like Senator Kennedy, who recently experienced a revelation concerning its crushing drear and immediately vowed to solve the whole problem by holding congressional hearings on how to make work a joyous occasion.

But of course it is not the common man who is afflicting us with inflationary monetary policies, followed by idiotic economic harangues, and a chaser of government spending. It is not the common man who hunkers away from the necessity of work. It is the empty-headed leader, the oaf who took a utopian like Charles Reich seriously when he published a book abounding with such economic wisdom as the following: "Work and living have become more and more pointless and empty. . . . For most Americans, work is mindless, exhausting, boring, servile, and hateful. . . . Our life activities have become plastic, vicarious, and false to our genuine needs, activities fabricated by others and forced upon us."

Mr. Reich delivered up that judgment in 1970, and to this very day such notions seem to have a powerful magic on the hearts of the empty-headed. Nonetheless even the confirmed second-raters who walk through the corridors of power should know better than to take such patter seriously. For years the utopian intellectuals have argued, in their art and in their political diatribes, the meaninglessness of bourgeois life; why should they not find bourgeois work meaningless also? Are we to believe that the second-rate leadership of this great bourgeois country has immersed itself so deeply in the sophistries of the utopian intellectuals that it too believes in the meaninglessness of life? Well then I suggest that their only honorable recourse is to follow the logic of their beliefs and to exit from their meaningless lives post haste, decorously, and without depositing those maudlin going-away cards that are so popular with the suicide set. The country will be better off without them.

No sensible person takes any utopian intellectual seriously when he launches his declarations about work. After all, the intellectual's work is about as *similar* to the work of the American as hair remover is to hair tonic. Intellectuals work alone, on their own schedules, free of practically any out-

(continued on page 31)

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Patrick Cosgrave

The Legendary Churchill

SHORTLY AFTER a recent book of mine on Churchill appeared, I took part in a radio discussion about his place in history. The moderator asked us, toward the end of the discussion, how we thought Churchill's reputation in Britain would look a century from now. Would things have so changed, he asked, that the achievement which looms so large today would have shrunk greatly in size? Or might Churchill's reputation have vanished altogether?

It is not an easy question to answer, whatever the historical figure under discussion. Most reputations go up and down from generation to generation, depending on the political or social mood of the moment, on the prevailing fashion of historians, and on the revelation of new evidence or reinterpretation of old evidence. In the discussion, however, Sir Colin Coote, an old friend of Churchill, former member of Parliament, and once editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, was adamant: he argued that if the serious denigration of Churchill had not taken hold by now, then it never would. And Lady Longford, biographer of Churchill and Queen Victoria, pointed out that the disparaging works which have already appeared have done little damage to Churchill's reputation. I was less sanguine. It is certainly true that Churchill has lost none of his grasp on the popular imagination in Britain, but I fully expect a later generation of historians to bring about a decline in the standing which he enjoys among his countrymen. That decline, however, will only be temporary, for I think Churchill occupies an unshakeable special place in the hearts of the British. And that place will be enhanced rather than diminished by the difficulties and decline of grandeur that Britain now endures.

The people, moreover, tend to ignore academic historical debate (on the whole very sensibly), and as they do not have a very factual grasp now of what precisely Churchill did, of how he saved his country, or of why they should think him great, so are they unlikely to have one in the future. No doubt his role in history will assume different legendary shapes, and a historian in the year 3000—if there are any historians then—who is anxious to make his reputation as a clever fellow, will publish a learned article raising the question of whether Churchill ever existed, just as historians have recently raised the question of whether Robin Hood ever existed. It will make no difference to the permanence of his reputation.

I should not speak quite so lightly of the worthy and industrious efforts of academic historians, however. They do seek the truth insofar as it can be found, and most of them are conscientious enough in their efforts. But it is very difficult for the academic historian to grasp or analyze a reputation which very quickly attains the status of myth. (I do not use the word *myth* here in its cant sense of a romantic untruth, but rather in its original sense of something essentially true but with inaccurate details.) The profuse mass of documentation which historians increasingly depend on lends itself more easily to interpreting policy than to describing the popular imagination. For example, in the first volume of my book *Churchill at War*, I tried to explain how the unrivalled power of Churchill's rhetoric inspired the people of Britain in 1940. But I did so by analyzing the network of decision-making which lay behind that rhetorical appeal and was for the most part invisible to the people, and by trying to show that, on balance, Churchill's decisions were necessary and wise and the people sensed as much. It would have been a far more difficult task, and one that I am not sure can ever be accomplished, to trace a profile of Churchill's popular reputation; and it would be the summation of popular historical achievement to connect the governor, in his most intimate Cabinet decision-making, with the mythical popular hero.

Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of evidence about Churchill's popular reputation, and a personal anecdote, moreover, a *recurring* anecdote, can illustrate its persistency. I have two bulldogs, and I walk them regularly in the area of London in which I live, a racially-mixed neighborhood. I have become accustomed, over a period of four years, to being stopped regularly by middle-aged or elderly folk who exclaim over the dogs. Invariably, they make two remarks. First, they observe that one rarely sees bulldogs nowadays: for though they are a symbolic British breed, bulldogs are expensive and difficult to keep, and there are not many about. Second, they note the similarity of the dogs to "Winston," who, as is now well known, practiced his bulldog visage in front of a mirror as soon as he heard that he was being compared with the animal. Now I expect such remarks from the elderly and the middle-aged, who remember vividly both Churchill and his resemblance. But I am astonished at the attention which the rarity value of a bulldog —and the seemingly extraordinary prodigality of having *two*—attracts among young people. And I have now lost count of the number of young people, and especially West Indian young people, who have asked me which of the dogs is called Winston. Thus does a mythic reputation grow through generations and across classes, creeds, and races. It is something the academic historian would find difficult to pin down and therefore irritating, but it has power nonetheless and, very likely, a power greater than all his volumes.

George Orwell, the celebrated socialist writer, patriot, and author of *1984*, carried out some empirical observations of his own, collecting evidence about the nature of the Churchill myth and its real substance. One choice anecdote he collected refers to the day when Churchill's body was taken by boat down the Thames, and the London dockers—one of the most bloody-minded of British trade unions—dipped their cranes in tribute to the war leader. According to

Orwell, the workers in dockland were convinced that the BBC had censored Churchill's broadcasts, and prevented him from giving free rein to a ribald element in his speech. Thus, the celebrated passage about fighting the Germans on the beaches and on the landing grounds was to have been followed by a sentence asserting, "We'll throw bottles at the buggers, because we'll have nothing left." The point about the story—and Orwell was an acute observer of behavior—was that dockland not only relished Churchill, but also attributed to him some of its own spirit, language, and style.

Fuller and more scientific evidence as to how the British people regarded Churchill in his greatest days may be found in the files of one of the earliest British public opinion poll organizations, Mass Observation; this material has been used in a number of studies, notably a recent article by Paul Addison on Churchill and the people. The conclusion of researchers delving into these files is much as I have suggested above: there was a widespread feeling of fierce identification with and love for Churchill, but it was founded less on any precise understanding of his strategy or personality than on a general appreciation of his unique combativeness.

Churchill was also appreciated as a leader of his people who insisted on sharing their dangers and suffering as far as possible. On one occasion, while he was visiting the East End of London, an air raid occurred. His aides naturally tried, in the midst of panic and confusion, to turn his car and enable the priceless commander to escape, but Churchill refused to depart. He understood, to be sure, that he was invaluable to the war effort, and that no leader could command as well as he. But he also understood that, fate having taken him in this difficult moment, he could not rush for safety either, nor would he want to: the whole principle of his nature and leadership was that of standing his ground. In any case, two observations are recorded of this occasion. The first, when Churchill began to weep at the destruction, was by a woman who said, "Look. He cares." The second was by another woman who shouted fiercely to him, as German bombs descended, "Give it 'em back, Winston." Thus, I believe, was born the strategy of bombing German cities.

In the radio discussion which I mentioned earlier the question of Churchill's greatness was discussed as usual in the abstract. I end my book with a quotation about Churchill from General Lord Ismay, who was his closest aide during the war: "I shall be accused of making him out a superman, but that is exactly what he is." The moderator of the program insisted that I was a partisan of Churchill's, and implied that the conclusion of my book—that, in General DeGaulle's words, "He forged a victory"—was the less to be trusted for that reason. Of course I am partisan, but I hope that my work on Churchill has both of the qualities which he wished to see in his own biography of his father, which he aimed to make "both filial and objective." The question of greatness, however, seemed to me to demand another. The attribution of greatness or supremacy in the common mind seems to be associated with the making of correct decisions, and, of course, one cannot call great in action a man who, in leadership, makes all the wrong decisions. Nonetheless, greatness may also reside in a personality, even apart from action.

It is commonly thought that Churchill was ailing badly before he retired as Prime Minister in the middle fifties, and it is certainly true that he was nothing like the man he was in 1940—though I would hazard the judgment that his great skill and experience were a crucial factor in the life of one of the best British governments we have seen in a generation. Certainly, it is thought, the decline was rapid and absolute after his retirement. Indeed, both his doctor, Lord Moran, and such close friends as Lord Bracken tried to keep him in office even after he was not really fit for the job, lest he fall into depression on leaving it. In July 1956 the distinguished American journalist C.L. Sulzberger, an old friend, visited Churchill in retirement at his country home, Chartwell, in Kent. At first Sulz-



berger observed only Churchill's torpor, but then: "After Lady Churchill had departed, we sat down in the sitting room again, he plonked himself into an armchair, ashes over the front of his siren suit, and suddenly, slowly came alive; not just the shreds of a great character and the impeccable courtesy of his personality, but the old flame and wisdom began to emerge."

The two men discussed a variety of subjects, and Churchill descanted with wisdom and insight on the problems of the world. But Sulzburger's "final impression was an extraordinary experience of seeing him come alive and then, tired out by the effort, by the walk, our long reading from his work, the conversation, the entire physical and mental effort, to see all that dynamism fade away. It was like watching a very strong light bulb during an electrical crisis: First a faint reddening of the filament, then a flickering, then a glow, and then a brilliant blaze of light. Finally, after being blinded by the sustained glare, again flickering, subsiding, just a red filament; then nothing." There was no doubt of the extraordinary power of Churchill's personality at all stages of his life: as one wartime colleague put it, he could frighten people, and this capacity, which is so hard to bring to life in history books, undoubtedly contributed in large measure to his capacity to galvanize the British war machine. As Sir Colin Coote said, there has been little effective or wholehearted criticism of Churchill's general conduct of the war. To be sure, episodes have been picked out and the finger of attack pointed, and this is true of his general career as well. But Churchill was built on such a gigantic scale, with such an extraordinary array of talents, and he was blessed, though only after much travail, with such destiny and fortune, that small forays against his reputation seem to inflict but flesh wounds.

It is very frequently said in Britain, even by those who admire the historical Churchill, and would not seek to criticize his conduct of affairs during the Second World War, that he is nonetheless a great figure frozen in the past, that he has nothing to say to Britain today. In this respect he could be unfavorably compared with a great contemporary, General DeGaulle; during his last period in office DeGaulle altered French policy in some important respects, and redefined its course in others, so that even today opponents of Gaullism often share established attitudes—e.g., in regard to the French nuclear weapon, or to the Middle East—which have not subsequently been changed. The outburst of indignation when President Giscard d'Estaing criticized President Ford, even more when he continued a series of French nuclear tests, was all the greater because the new President was not thought to be Gaullist—the epithet of criticism as applied to French policy. There is no equivalent abstract in English: a Prime Minister who uses Churchill's rhetoric—as Mr. Wilson did more than once during his first period of government—invites ridicule more than he excites admiration or anger.

But this is perfectly understandable. So large does Churchill loom in our imagination that it is inconceivable that any politician could approach him, let alone emulate him. He is to the British almost as the Constitution is to the Americans. At the present time memory of him merely causes sorrow—a certain pain that we no longer have anything like him. But, as time passes, as he recedes into the distance and his record and character become more manageable, we shall begin to be able to make use of him, of parts of his record and achievement, for inspection and teaching. For example, at a time when Parliament is under threat, both from an expanding bureaucracy and from seriously dissident elements in the community, it will become useful to recall how great a parliamentarian Churchill was, and how devoted to the institution. For no country can ever possess a statesman as great as Churchill and not have his impact sunk deeply into its character. However antediluvian his style looks at the moment, he was, as Malraux said of DeGaulle, "a man of the day before yesterday and of the day after tomorrow." His tomorrow will come again. □

Kirk Emmert

The Imperial Churchill

IN HIS ESSAY, "Consistency in Politics," Winston Churchill suggests that the most important thing to know about a reputed statesman is the nature of the broad purposes which guided his judgments and actions. If, however, we attempt to discern the ends of Churchill's own "life of action and advocacy" we are at first bewildered. Churchill was a defender of democracy, but he was keenly aware of the inherent inequalities among men; he was a partisan of human excellence, but he strongly supported efforts to raise the minimal level of well-being of the common man; he was the friend and imaginative utilizer of technology and the fruits of industrialization, and yet he could not reconcile himself to the scientific attitude toward man and nature and favored the martial over the commercial virtues; he spoke of man's rights, and yet he also took his bearings from man's obligation to perfect himself. Although we may safely reject the view of some of Churchill's detractors that he was little more than a gifted opportunist, we must also admit that it is difficult to discern the ultimate purpose or principles to which he consistently adhered. In a letter to his cousin, written in 1899, Churchill observed that "the improvement of the British breed is my political aim in life," but he noted that this aim was often in conflict with "another great principle" to which he was also committed—"Liberty." Churchill was a man of principle, but he seems to have been torn between his dedication to virtue and human excellence and his dedication to liberty and the democratic regime of liberty.

Our times and our democratic regime lead us to be familiar with, and receptive to, the democratic more than the aristocratic Churchill. We remember the great war leader and protector of liberal democracy against Nazi tyranny. We like to forget that in the 1920s and 1930s Churchill, in his great *Marlborough* and in numerous essays, expressed grave doubts about the viability and goodness of modern mass democracy. And we find even more unpalatable Churchill's dogged commitment to empire at a time when that kind of rule had long ceased to be defensible in the eyes of all right-thinking men. Those who want to understand Churchill's statesmanship, however, must take seriously both the aristocratic and the democratic Churchill. It will not do to dismiss his advocacy of empire as his one great "blindspot," for that advocacy had deep roots in his whole political outlook. Consideration of his views on empire suggests, in fact, that Dorothy Thompson was correct when she observed that Churchill was an "aristocrat" whose "spirit is Aristotelian."

Churchill did not stress the economic impetus for empire. He thought there were more powerful and elevated causes of national expansion. Britain's Empire, moreover, was frequently an economic drain on the nation: "Imperialism and economics clash," Churchill observed, "as often as honesty and self-interest." Nevertheless, he remained convinced that given its essentially artificial economic situation, the economic health of twentieth century Britain depended on the maintenance of her Empire. The Empire supported access to foreign markets and raw materials, and the imperial navy secured British trade and commerce. Now "that we have got this immense population here at this level of economic society . . . we must," Churchill noted, "be a strong, successful, scientific, commercial empire or starve. There is no half-way house for Britain between greatness and ruin."

Commerce gave impetus to British expansion, but Churchill thought the more fundamental cause of imperial growth was the need for military security. Even essentially defensive and satisfied nations are led into war and expansion just in order to protect themselves and their present possessions. And because of its necessary reliance on prestige as the dominant means of sustaining its authority, because of the general hostility—provoked or unprovoked—of the uncivilized peoples who border a widespread empire, and because of the threats to imperial security caused by the fear, envy, and ambition of other great powers, every imperial nation must become expansionist. In practice a defensive empire tends to become almost indistinguishable from a deliberately offensive or expansive empire. Churchill would have been sympathetic to current defenders of American empire who stress the connection between the growth and necessity of American empire and the nation's interest in its security and in world order. The imperial project cannot, however, be simply attributed to the compulsion of circumstances. Vigorous men and nations are also driven to empire by a desire to prevail or to be predominant. The "spirit of empire," Churchill observed, is "the desire for power" or the "desire to prevail," a "great fact which practical men must reckon with."

Churchill thought that true threats to self-preservation may justify a nation's expansion, but that desires for greater wealth and power do not in themselves legitimize imperial rule. He also distinguished between rule over civilized and rule over uncivilized nations. One civilized nation may not rule another without its consent unless the subservience of the subjugated nation is indispensable to the self-preservation of the ruler. A just empire over the uncivilized, on the other hand, need not be founded on the deliberate or freely given consent of the governed. It must, however, be directed to their improvement: It must be a "civilizing empire." Because only the rule of those of superior merit elevates the ruled, Churchill held that "intrinsic merit is the only title of a dominant race to its possessions." The true imperialist seeks to restrain the nation's desires for power and wealth by putting them in the service of a higher end—civilization.

Churchill's advocacy of civilizing empire was grounded on the view that all men are under a sovereign obligation to perfect their higher, uniquely human faculties, to become, to the extent of their varying capacities, more complete human beings. The right of the uncivilized to liberty is subordinate to their obligation to improve; their right to self-government derives from their ability to govern themselves. Only when man is striving to perfect himself does he reach his full humanity and attain the happiness of which he is capable. Human life is not worth living when it has lost sight of a sound standard of human excellence and of the need to strive to attain that standard. A just empire puts the uncivilized in touch with civilization and provides them with the external assistance without which their development would be greatly retarded, if not completely prevented. The overriding importance of man's obligation to become civilized requires that he submit himself, when it is available, to the expeditious and assured agency of imperial rule.

Churchill thought that empire elevated the uncivilized by establishing law, order, and more efficient administration, by expanding the range of desires of the uncivilized, and by satisfying these desires by means of large capital improvements and the use of scientific technology. He saw the imperial aspiration for the uncivilized as being not the attainment of full human excellence, but the passing of the threshold which marks the boundary between barbarism and civilization—the development of a minimal capacity for self-government.

Churchill was less concerned with civilizing empire's ability to elevate the uncivilized ruled than he was with its tendency to further improve its civilized rulers. He did not view empire as a burden to be endured or as merely one of the inescapable responsibilities of a powerful nation. Nor did he think that empire is grounded in a self-denying obligation of the civilized to succor the needy. The ascent from barbarism to full civilization does not, in his view, entail a movement from the depths of narrow self-seeking to the peaks of selfless altruism. The moral foundation of empire, and thus also of civilization, rests not on the distinction between altruistic duty and self-interest but on that between narrow, "slavish," or undue self-interest and the pursuit of one's own good broadly or nobly conceived. The fully civilized man, the man of noble self-regard, wants the best things for himself, and he considers moral and political virtue to be the things most worth having. The direct consequence of his striving for excellence is that he benefits others who, in the absence of his striving, would have no claim to the benefits they receive. Civilized men and nations are obliged to themselves, to the high standard which they have set for themselves. Their obligation does not run down to the uncivilized, or across to their fellow men, but up to man fully civilized—to civilization.

For Churchill, human excellence was largely equivalent to political excellence, to

the moral and political virtues needed to govern the political community: He considered the statesman to be the embodiment of human virtue. Now man does not attain virtue naturally, without substantial effort on his own part. The virtues of the fully civilized man are developed and perfected only by energetic striving to perform the deeds and to engage in the activities which those virtues make possible. The virtues can be developed, then, only in situations which call for them and give them scope. Without the need to give someone his due there can be no development of justice, without a substantial danger, no courage, without political responsibilities, no prudence. Man is pre-eminently a political being because, in addition to needing assistance to meet his primary needs for security and economic well-being, he perfects himself only through political activity, and particularly by holding public office. In a search for sufficient scope for his abilities Churchill went from sport to war to politics, activities which he ranked according to their ability to give full scope to his powers.

Churchill's advocacy of civilizing empire followed from his view that the seeking and exercise of political responsibilities are necessary means to human excellence. Because of its widespread responsibilities for governing others, an imperial nation can provide a much greater number of authoritative offices than a nonimperial nation, and particularly than a modern democratic nation which tends to have relatively weak offices and elevates private over public affairs. To have confined the British at home would have been to stifle their unusual potential for excellence: Churchill observed that within the broader Empire "the peculiar gifts for administration and high civic virtue of our race may find a healthy and honorable scope."

The most demanding offices in an empire are those at the peak of the imperial government itself. Churchill thought that the highest kind of political and moral virtue was that which existed on the grandest scale. The highest possibilities for statesmanship exist for those who "hold with honor the foremost stations in the greatest storms." Only imperial nations are of sufficient magnitude to provide scope for the most splendid and demanding forms of political excellence. Only at the head of an extensive empire can the truly great-souled man have his day. Ruling a civilizing empire is the activity which marks the culmination of the search which men must undertake to find scope for, and thereby to develop, their "powers."

In addition to perfecting the exceptional few, Churchill thought that empire elevates the common citizen who remains at home. Empire increases the security and economic well-being of all classes. Being part of a great imperial project fortifies a citizen's self-respect, augments his patriotism, and gives a larger, more political meaning to his life: It makes him a more public-spirited citizen and, thereby, a more complete human being. Because it requires for its continued existence a high level of moral and civic virtue from a few, and a lesser but significant measure of virtue from all its citizens, empire keeps alive for the whole nation a more complete view of human excellence than would otherwise survive in a modern mass democracy. The possession of an empire thus tends to direct in the broadest sense the development of its ruling nation. Empire can be the basic cause of a nation's cultivating a particular kind of man and the way of life he personifies.

Churchill called the British regime an "Imperial Democracy." He had serious doubts about modern mass democracy because he thought that it might reduce everyone to a common level of mediocrity. His attempt to combine civilizing empire and democracy should be seen as perhaps the most significant part of his efforts to give modern democracy a higher tone. Empire is the essentially undemocratic means by which democracy, while retaining its foundation in the equal rights of all, is pushed in the direction of concern with encouraging human excellence. Empire is the means to civilize democracy. Churchill thought that the addition to a democratic regime of empire, and of the principle it represents, made that regime worthy of his full support. □

Jeffery D. Wallin

The Warrior Churchill–1915

IT USED TO BE that a young man aspiring to learn the art of statesmanship first apprenticed himself to the art of war. From Alexander the Great to Henry V to the First Duke of Marlborough, there was an almost unbroken line of great statesmen who were also great generals. But the advance of science is said to have made war the specialty of technicians, and many have come to question the ability of politicians to comprehend strategic matters. This suspicion seemed to be confirmed by the fact that Hitler's attempt to direct World War II personally made it easier to defeat Germany than it might otherwise have been. But what makes this opinion difficult to question is that it is thought to be supported by the most fundamental principles of modern democracy. Premodern statesmen saw war as a means to the ends of politics, which included, among other things, civil and religious virtues. But modern democratic regimes are based on a social contract theory of government which reduces the ends of politics to peace and prosperity. To many this implies that excellence in the art of war is inappropriate to democratic statesmanship.

Winston S. Churchill was the last democratic statesman to combine the roles of general—at least in the sense of making strategy—and statesman. This may have been because he was the last democratic statesman who thought that the best kind of life was based upon, but not encompassed by, peace and prosperity. By assuming the title of Minister of Defense as well as Prime Minister he became vulnerable to the criticisms that he could not possibly have known as much about strategy and tactics as his military advisors, and the subtler, but perhaps more important charge that his appreciation of military and civic virtue was unseemly in the leader of a democracy. This last charge cannot be dealt with in a short article; but the opinion that Churchill was a poor strategist is more circumscribed and rests upon the events of the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, when Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill's resignation from the Admiralty in May 1915 is usually attributed to the fact that he bullied his First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, into an unsound naval scheme at the Dardanelles, thus forcing Fisher to resign in protest. The country naturally supported Admiral Fisher, and this resulted in Churchill's own resignation. In fact, however, his ouster had much less to do with his "interference" in naval matters and much more to do with partisan politics than is usually thought.

To appreciate fully Churchill's position in 1915 it is necessary to recall that he had begun his political career as a Conservative and had become a Liberal only in 1904. His switch of party was accompanied by a switch in politics. In addition to advocating free trade, Churchill now took up the cause of the workingman. In an effort to move the Liberal Party to the left, and thereby to co-opt the emerging Labour Party (which he thought dangerous because of its constant appeals to class interest), he concerned himself with the problems of sweated labor, and, as Home Secretary, he opened the first labor exchanges, began work on unemployment insurance, and was an effective proponent of prison reform. This did not, of course, make him popular with the Tories, and when he took up the cause of the People's Budget in 1909, he added further fuel to the charge that when he left the Tory Party he turned his back on his class (he was a cousin to the Duke of Marlborough) as well. On the other hand, his radicalism seemed opportunistic to many of the members of his new party, and his open ambition often unsettled them. Thus, while powerful for the moment, he had made many enemies in the Opposition, and had made few friends in his new party. This became apparent when, as a price of joining a coalition in May 1915, the Conservatives demanded Churchill's dismissal and the Liberals acquiesced with few misgivings.

By the end of 1914 the war in the West

had become stabilized along a front extending from the Swiss Alps to Nieuport on the English Channel. Germany had placed most of her forces along this comparatively short line, with only a small army left in the East to block the advance of the Russians. Russia had such severe munitions shortages, however, that she was unable to stop Germany's own advance under Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The superiority of defensive methods of warfare (caused primarily by the invention of the machine gun) prevented the French and the British from breaking through the Western lines to relieve the pressure on Russia. It soon became clear that a turn in the direction of the war was in the making, for if Russia were defeated Germany would be able to concentrate her efforts upon breaking the stalemate in the West. Yet as the trenches in France became more elaborate, and offensive attacks became more costly, it was difficult to imagine how Russia could be helped. Since the lines could not be pierced, the question facing the British War Council was: how could the lines be circumvented so that aid could be sent to Russia?

To answer this question it was necessary to take a continental view of the war. If one looked far enough to the north or the south one could find spots barren of the terrible machine guns and barbed wire. Hence the question became whether an attack should be made from the north (from the Baltic or the North Sea) or from the south (the Balkans).

Originally, both Churchill and Fisher favored a northern project. But to make a direct attack on Germany would have required a large army and according to Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, it would have been impossible to provide one in the foreseeable future. This left the possibility of an attack through the Balkans, probably through Turkey, an ally of Germany and Austria. Turkey blocked the only feasible southern route to Russia (through the Dardanelles and the Black Sea), and thus a successful attack on Turkey would have opened a supply route to Russia. Furthermore, a success at the Dardanelles might, by convincing the remaining Balkan powers of the superiority of the Entente's power, persuade them to join the Allies. Accordingly, Churchill made several attempts to gain a Balkan army by promising Greece, the strongest Balkan power next to Turkey, a share of the plunder when the war was over and the Ottoman Empire broken up. This was a strong appeal as the antagonisms of these small states were old and fierce. Churchill came close to success twice, being defeated the last time by a stubborn and shortsighted Russian refusal to allow a Greek army into Constantinople; wanting Constantinople for herself, Russia denied herself the aid which might have saved her from the defeats that eventually led to revolution and her capitulation at Brest-Litovsk.

Nevertheless, the Russian need was so great that in January 1915 the Grand Duke Nicholas asked the British to make a demonstration in order to draw off Austrian forces in the Caucasus. Lord Kitchener again said he had no troops to spare (a statement Churchill did not agree with) and then asked Churchill to make a naval demonstration at the Dardanelles. Churchill inquired of the commanding admiral in the Mediterranean whether he thought the Dardanelles Straits could be forced without assistance from the army and was surprised when he was told that they might be if enough ships were used in a methodical, stage-by-stage attack. This idea received the enthusiastic support of Lord Kitchener, who had direct experience of the situation in the Middle East and who expected Constantinople to capitulate once the fleet had forced its way into the Sea of Marmara. Though novel (since Nelson it had been a premise of the British navy that ships could not successfully fight forts without the support of the army), the Admiralty War Group supported an attack on the Dardanelles, partly because it was the only available means of breaking the deadlock, and partly because the ships which would be used to bombard the forts were old pre-Dreadnought ships of the Canapus class which would be useless in a modern naval battle anyway. In fact, these ships were already destined for the scrapheap. Of course, everyone concerned would rather have had a combined operation; but Kitchener said he could not provide one, and thus the navy decided to undertake the job alone. No one on the War Council or in the Naval War Group objected to the plan. After all, if the attack failed, only old and practically useless ships would have been lost. But if it succeeded Russia might be saved and the Balkans would almost certainly have been drawn into the war on the side of the Allies.

The first powerful voice of dissension came some eight days after the War Council had approved the plan. Lord Fisher had returned to the Admiralty in 1914 with an overriding purpose: to defeat the German High Seas Fleet, or if the fleet refused to fight, to invade Germany from the north. He, like Churchill, had acquiesced in the purely naval attack only when he became convinced that the necessary troops could not be found for either a northern expedition or a combined operation against Turkey. He, as well as the other members of the Admiralty War Group, had agreed that the operation would not endanger the margin of safety of the Grand Fleet since it contemplated using only old battleships. These circumstances never changed; but Fisher's support of the operation did. On January 21, after seeing and agreeing to all the minutes of the previous week dealing with the specifics of the Dardanelles, Fisher objected to it on the ground that it was taking too many ships from the main fleet.

Churchill's critics have usually assumed that Fisher objected on the ground that the navy could not get through the Dardanelles Straits without the support of the military. But all of the arguments against ships fighting forts were made *after* the abandonment of the attack. Fisher's only objections were that it would be better to attack with an army than without one—a position all accepted, but for which no one had a remedy—and that the operation was seriously weakening the Grand Fleet by taking too many needed ships from Admiral Jellicoe, Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet. To this second objection it may be observed that if Fisher's arguments were sound on January 21, they would have been just as sound on January 12, when the plan was confirmed. At that time, however, Fisher had made no objections (he had even on his own initiative sent the newest battleship afloat, the *Queen Elizabeth*, to help the Dardanelles fleet).

It is clear that if Fisher's fears were valid, the operation should have been called off: Britain's superior navy was her primary source of military security. But there are sound reasons for Churchill's disagreement with Fisher on this point. By January 1915, the navy had cleared the outer seas of enemy ships and had blocked the German navy up in its home harbors. Thus it had protected British imports of food and materials and at the same time had guaranteed the safe passage of British reinforcements to France. But in doing this it had not defeated the smaller, but efficient German High Seas Fleet. Hence, maintaining the superiority of the British fleet continued to be the primary responsibility of the Admiralty. On this point Fisher and Churchill agreed. What they disagreed about was the disposition of surpluses and reserves. Churchill argued that the margin of safety necessary to ensure victory had been met. Fisher argued, from January 21 on, that it had not, and that the Dardanelles operation was draining needed ships from the Grand Fleet. It is not necessary to enter into technical questions of firepower and tonnage to resolve the dispute. As already mentioned, Fisher himself had not objected when the Dardanelles was originally decided upon. But what is even more damaging to his position is that throughout his dispute with Churchill he was always ready to take as many ships from the Grand Fleet as necessary if they could be used in a *northern*, rather than in a southern, operation. Yet if the Grand Fleet could spare ships for an operation Fisher liked, it is clear that it could spare them for an operation that he did not.

This inconclusive debate did not decide the issue, however. On March 18, the navy attacked the forts at the Dardanelles. At first the action was seen as a limited success. The British lost only 73 men, although the French had lost 600 when the *Bouvet* sunk after striking a mine. This unswept minefield claimed three other ships as well, and eventually led to the abandonment of the enterprise. The argument has since been made that the ships could not have succeeded because they could not get close enough to the forts to knock them out. The forts were protected by minefields which could not be swept until the batteries and movable howitzers protecting them had been destroyed. And these guns were in turn protected by the minefields, thus completing a circular and impregnable defense. As tight as this argument appears to be at first sight, it is interesting to note that it was never made by Vice-Admiral de Robeck, commander of the forces at the Dardanelles. As soon as the battle was over he telegraphed the Admiralty that he was ready to renew the attack as soon as the weather permitted. As far as the difficulty of sweeping the mines is concerned, he correctly understood that the problem was primarily due to the fact that his minesweeping force was ill-suited to its task. The current in the Straits was fast, and the fire from the shore heavy. But his minesweepers were old wooden fishing trawlers that had been converted for naval use. They were slow, and what was worse, unarmored. Hence it was difficult for their crews (fishermen, not sailors) to face the fire from the minefield batteries. De Robeck wanted to reconstitute

this force by replacing the trawlers with fast destroyers equipped to sweep mines, and this was in fact comleted by April 4. As for the main forts, by the end of the day they had been dominated by the ships. Besides, it was known at the time that the forts were short of ammunition. It seemed clear that the Straits could be passed if the attack were renewed. The ships never again fired another shot, however, and for entirely unrelated reasons.

It will be recalled that Lord Kitchener had supported the naval plan from the first, both because he could not provide an army and because he thought the navy could get through on its own. He had since been persuaded to send the Twenty-ninth Division, among others, to help in case the navy ran into unforeseen difficulties. On March 22, General Sir Ian Hamilton, commander of the British military forces destined for the Dardanelles, and Vice-Admiral de Robeck had a conference aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*. Without consulting the Admiralty, de Robeck decided—whether prompted by Hamilton or not is uncertain—to abandon the purely naval attack in favor of a military operation, even though it would require waiting until all of Hamilton's forces arrived, which would not be until the middle of April!

De Robeck remained convinced he could reach Constantinople. His reason for abandoning the attack was that he was concerned about his supply line once he reached the Sea of Marmara. When the War Council had originally approved the plan it had done so because in the judgment of its members, Constantinople would capitulate as soon as the fleet reached the Sea of Marmara. De Robeck, however, differed with this political decision and thought it would be necessary to keep his ships in hostile waters for an extended period of time. That is to say, Vice-*Admiral* de Robeck, with the support of *General* Hamilton, abandoned an operation begun because of political judgments (including the importance of drawing the Balkan powers into the War) regarding the likely consequences of a successful passage. The naval attack, which was approved as much for political as for naval considerations, was abandoned on purely political grounds by a naval officer.

Since no one had argued that the ships could not get through the Straits, and because any delay increased the possibility that Austrian submarines would arrive before the operation was finished, Churchill wanted to order de Robeck to continue with the attack. Unfortunately, Fisher chose this moment to discredit Churchill and to further his own plans for an attack in the north. Now that the admiral on the spot had decided to abandon the operation Fisher absolutely refused to have anything more to do with it, and he did his best both by his resignation and by using his contacts with the Opposition to see Churchill removed from the Admiralty.

Although later observers have often testified to the strength of Asquith's Liberal government at the beginning of the war (his cabinet included Churchill, Lloyd George, Lord Kitchener, and Earl Grey), it is often overlooked that it operated under one important handicap. There had always been a strong element of pacifism in the Liberal Party and this image had to be changed if the country were to feel confident that the Party could win the war. Although Fisher was not appointed First Sea Lord for this reason alone, his presence did help convince people that the Liberal Government meant business. After the navy had abandoned the attack, the army landed and suffered a series of reverses which finally led to a retreat and the abandonment of the attempt to reach Constantinople. While the country was looking for a scapegoat, Fisher resigned, thus focusing attention on Churchill's part in the original naval plan. The Government could ill afford Fisher's resignation at any time, but especially in May 1915 (it was still feeling the effects of the Shell Shortage scandal). Fisher sent Asquith a list of stipulations which would have to be met if Fisher were to return to the Admiralty. These culminated in the extraordinary demand that he have "complete charge of the war at sea, together with the *absolute* sole disposition of the fleet and the appointment of all officers of all ranks whatsoever, and absolutely untrammelled sole command of all the sea forces whatsoever." These demands were not met, of course; but with Fisher's urging, Bonar Law, leader of the Conservative Party, insisted upon Churchill's removal from the Admiralty as one of his conditions for a coalition (the only means by which the Liberal Party could stay in power).

Thus Churchill was forced to resign in the face of criticisms by the Conservatives that he had meddled in technical naval strategies and tactics. But it was not Churchill the politician who caused the disaster of the Dardanelles by interfering in professional naval matters. Rather it was Fisher, the sailor, who, using the opportunity given him by de Robeck's disagreement with the political judgment of the War Council, destroyed a sound naval plan. In this case, at least, the historians are right when they complain that politics and strategy were mixed with bad results; but they are right for the wrong reasons. Had the politician governed the admiral, the Dardanelles attack would probably have succeeded. A passage to Russia might have shortened the war by years, and would have given renewed prestige to the Tsarist regime. The Bolsheviks might not have seized power and the totalitarian governments generated by Bolshevism might never have come to dominate the politics of the twentieth century. In this instance, at least, the cause of democracy would have been better served if the art—or science—of war had been left to the politicians. To paraphrase a comment of Churchill's in the Second World War: War is too important to be left to the generals and admirals. □

Philip Vander Elst

The Warrior Churchill–1940

Book Review

Churchill at War
Alone, 1939–40 (Vol. 1)

by Patrick Cosgrave
Collins [English Publisher]

PERHAPS NO FIGURE in recent history has been the object of so much study and commentary as Winston Churchill. One would think therefore that it was impossible to say anything original about the greatest Englishman of the twentieth century, yet that is precisely what Patrick Cosgrave's new book does.

Churchill at War is not a banal biography which merely takes the reader down a mental portrait gallery and invites him to gaze admiringly at a frozen fragment of time before beckoning him on to the next scene. On the contrary, it is a remarkably documented and acute analysis of Churchill as an administrator, general (for that, in effect, he was), and politician during the most crucial period in his life. The greatest merit of Mr. Cosgrave's work is that his analysis of Churchill's mind and character under the the stress of war makes constant intellectual demands on the reader: it compels him to appreciate the paramount importance of integrating the exhaustive (and at times, exhausting) data of wartime organization —culled from Cabinet minutes, memoranda, and letters—with the quirks of individual psychology and the impact made by the actual movement of events. The result is an intelligently constructed puzzle in which the relationships between the bewildering variety of pieces are subjected to a rigorous and coherent scrutiny. The reader finds insights of unusual clarity and good sense on matters which must inevitably remain largely conjectural.

Mr. Cosgrave's account of Churchill's role in the first and most critical phase of the war, weaves the events of 1940 into a backcloth against whose starkness and simplicity the essence of Churchill's genius is most sharply defined.

We are constantly aware of the tension between Churchill's brilliant and sweeping grasp of strategy and his more volatile, though still formidable, command of tacti-

cal detail. His realization that in a conflict between a continental power like Germany and a maritime power like Britain, the latter's central objective had to be one of blockade and containment (ultimately leading to an offensive strategy), combined with an unfortunate tendency toward excessive interference with the disposition of forces by commanders on the spot. Thus Churchill recognized correctly the need to prevent Axis domination of the Mediterranean and North Africa if Britain's trade routes and links with the Dominions were not to be imperiled and her strategy of containment destroyed, but he unjustifiably harassed Wavell to take the offensive when the latter was hampered in his operations by lack of materials and equipment. On the other hand, Churchill's extraordinary capacity for detecting and striking at the enemy's jugular vein—witness his plans to use naval power to cut Germany off from her sources of ore in Scandinavia and to mine German waterways in order to disrupt her internal communications—was prejudiced as much by the procrastination and chronic indecisiveness of his colleagues as by any personal rashness on his part. The fiasco of the Norwegian campaign was principally a reflection of Chamberlain's inability to guide his Cabinet and infuse the war machine with a central impetus and a sense of purpose. From the moment Churchill took over and was able to impose his will on the conduct of the war, the beneficial effects were quick to materialize.

At a time when it has become the fashion to criticize Churchill and minimize his personal contribution to victory, Mr. Cosgrave's book reminds us of the indispensable part Churchill played in making the correct decisions at the most critical moments. In a powerful onslaught on the Dowding myth, Mr. Cosgrave shows how important Churchill's opposition to depleting the strength of Fighter Command in Britain (in the vain hope of propping up France) was in saving the Island from invasion. Similarly, the decision to destroy the French navy at Oran rather than let it fall into the hands of the Germans, and to send vital tank reinforcements to the Middle East at a time when Britain herself was in deadly danger, can be very largely attributed to the impact of Churchill's personality, in particular to his ruthlessness and steadfastness of purpose.

Churchill's immense talent for cross-examination and administration blended with a depth of psychological insight which enabled him both to sense the mood of the nation, and to awaken its pride and patriotism. In addition, Churchill had the ability to select brilliant subordinates and to delegate important responsibilities to them, which happily complemented his awareness of organizational weaknesses and the consequent need for energetic reconstruction. Nowhere was this more apparent than in his appointment of Beaverbrook to overhaul aircraft production and of Bevin to obtain the enthusiastic and unwearying cooperation of organized labor in the common war effort.

Mr. Cosgrave is far from painting an uncritical picture of Churchill the Warlord. Nevertheless, the unmistakeable impression left by his book is that of the unfashionable truth that one of the most vital determinants of history is still the personalities of its chief participants. Churchill, describing his own part in the war, ascribed victory to the lionheartedness of the nation. "I had the luck to be called upon to give the roar." It is Mr. Cosgrave's achievement that he demonstrates how self-deprecating that remark was. □

William Kristol

The Victorian Churchill

Book Review

Great Contemporaries

by Winston S. Churchill
University of Chicago, $7.95

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS has reissued, in celebration of the one-hundredth anniversary of Winston Churchill's birth, his collection of twenty-five essays entitled *Great Contemporaries*, first published in 1937 and long out of print. Their central theme is the "group of British statesmen who shone at the end of the last century and the beginning of this," and the book serves, Churchill tells us, as a commentary on the vast changes that have taken place in British politics since then. The book also includes essays on nonpolitical personages and on foreign leaders, and could well be read simply for its character sketches, of which Churchill's portrayal of "Leon Trotsky, Alias Bronstein," is perhaps the most famous, and which non-Trotskyite readers of this journal will undoubtedly enjoy.

Yet the book as a whole is not polemical; Churchill's attitude toward most of his —and all of his British—Great Contemporaries is sympathetic. The work's dominant tone is one of melancholy. Churchill's portrait of the twilight of aristocratic England leads him to feel, he tells us in his Preface, "how much has changed in our political life," and although "we must all hope" that it is only an illusion that our ancestors were "wonderful giants" compared with us, Churchill seems to believe it is so. Churchill is not at all unaware of the improvements and progress that modern technological development and democratic politics have brought in many spheres, and he is also well aware of the limitations of his Great Contemporaries. But his sympathy and admiration for these "Great Men" is evident; he chooses not to consider those men "who are with us today," in 1937, as his contemporaries, but rather those men than whom he was, in fact, "far younger." He allies himself, as it were, not with the political leaders of the thirties but with the leaders of "the old vanishing, and now vanished, oligarchic world which across the centuries had built the might and the freedom of Britain." Churchill says of Roseberry, in one of his most interesting essays, "He was often palpably out oftouch with [the modern] environment; perhaps that is no censure upon him."

Part of the achievement of the Victorian age lies in its preserving an essentially aristocratic form of government while encouraging the upward movement of "the men of the new middle class"; the British regime maintained the elevated nature of a regime in which "the aristocratic circles . . . dominated the political scene" and pondered and debated the future of the nation, while allowing "the full fruition of outstanding capacity" of men like Peel, Disraeli, Chamberlain, and F.E. Smith. Yet that age, whose destruction was ensured by World War I, was not entirely golden and was decaying before World War I. Although "Britain herself was universally envied and accepted as the leader in an advancing and hopeful civilization," the period was marred and warped by the way the Irish question came to dominate British political life, and it was with the Irish question that the great traditions of Parliamentary decorum and reasonableness began to seem irrelevant. The greatness of late nineteenth century England rested in and reinforced a strong feeling of confidence and even a certain restriction of horizon which rendered it incapable of coping with the issues of the modern age, much perhaps as Coriolanus is incapable of adapting to a new social order. This incapacity, however, may reflect as much on the new social order as on those whose horizons are too narrow but perhaps also too high to adapt.

Churchill is reminiscent of Tocqueville in his acceptance of the inevitability of the passing of the old regime and in his simultaneous doubts as to what will replace it. Surely few in modern times have shared with Churchill and Tocqueville so acute an appreciation of both sides of the coin of political change. For example, Churchill maintains, on the one hand, that British trade-unionism "has introduced a narrowing element into our public life," and "has become the main foundation of a socialist political party, which has ruled the State greatly to its disadvantage, and will assuredly do so again." On the other hand, Churchill writes that British trade unions have been on the whole a "stable force" compared with movements on the Continent, that they have brought to the forefront

"the point of view of the toiler" and his requirements, and that their sturdy patriotism in war was invaluable.

Yet for all the improvements of the modern era, for all the "vast and rapid expansion" of the "knowledge, science, wealth, and power of mankind," not only have certain refined aristocratic virtues disappeared but anarchy and dictatorship seem more and more prevalent. The "increasing darkness around" casts doubt on the beneficence of the "scourge of modernity." More particularly, there can be little question that in the sphere of British politics such men, for example, as John Morley, are not to be found today. "The tidal wave of democracy and the volcanic explosion of the War have swept the shores bare. I cannot see any figure which resembles or recalls the Liberal statesmen of the Victorian epoch. To make head against the aristocratic predominance of those times, a Lancashire lad, the son of a Blackburn doctor without favor or fortune, had need of every intellectual weapon, of the highest personal address, and of all that learning, courtesy, dignity and consistency could bestow. Nowadays when 'one man is as good as another—or better,' as Morley once ironically observed, anything will do. The leadership of the privileged has passed away; but it has not been succeeded by that of the eminent. We have entered the region of mass effects. The pedestals which had for some years been vacant have now been demolished. Nevertheless, the world is moving on; and moving so fast that few have time to ask—whither. And to these few only a babel responds."

For all his silence about the less elevated aspects of nineteenth century life, Churchill explicitly recognizes the insufficiency of much of late nineteenth century Liberalism. Asquith, a man of "vast knowledge, faithful industry, deep thought," "knew where he stood on every question of life and affairs in an altogether unusual degree." But in some respects this was a limitation. For it led to scorn for people and even for events which "did not conform to the pattern he had with so much profound knowledge and reflection decidedly adopted." Asquith's opinions were "cut in bronze"; but "nature never draws a line without smudging it." "Conditions are so variable, episodes so unexpected, experiences so conflicting, that flexibility of judgment and a willingness to assume a somewhat humbler attitude towards external phenomena may well play their part in the equipment of a modern Prime Minister." Asquith was unsuited to be a modern Prime Minister. Churchill's Great Contemporaries could not deal with "the immense, fascinating, yet mysterious and unmeasured new growths which everywhere are bursting forth amid the ruins of the structure" they had known.

Churchill counts himself as a Victorian, and parts of his accounts of his Great Contemporaries are remarkably applicable to himself. Of Roseberry, for example, he says, "His life was set in an atmosphere of tradition. The Past stood ever at his elbow and was the counsellor on whom he most relied. He seemed to be attended by Learning and History, and to carry into current events an air of ancient majesty. His voice was melodious and deep, and often, when listening, one felt in living contact with the centuries which are gone, and perceived the long continuity of our island tale." Yet Roseberry, the last British Prime Minister never to sit in Commons, was, as his career suggests, unsuited to the modern democratic age. The Victorians, for all their stature, were able to busy themselves and contend "about minor things. What long, brilliant, impassioned letters they wrote each other about refined personal and political issues of which the modern Juggernaut progression takes no account! They never had to face, as we have done, and still do, the possibility of national ruin. Their main foundations were never shaken. They dwelt in an age of British splendor and unchallenged leadership. The art of government was exercised within a limited sphere. World-revolution, mortal defeat, national subjugation, chaotic degeneration, or even national bankruptcy, had not laid steel claws upon their sedate, serene, complacent life. Roseberry flourished in an age of great men and small events." It seems that the Victorians' "course was clear and conscious" at least partly because "the issues were not so large as to escape human control." The clear superiority of the Victorians is questionable because the relative docility of the times in which they lived may have made their greatness possible.

Churchill, however, who considered as his contemporaries Roseberry and Chamberlain, not Attlee and Baldwin, did in fact "face the possibility of national ruin," and he mastered it; his ability in the supreme crisis of the twentieth century suggests his surmounting of the high but narrow horizon of his "contemporaries." But that Churchill was perhaps the only man who could have saved England from mortal defeat suggests the superiority of the England which formed him to modern England. Churchill in a sense justified and ennobled in deed as well as in speech that age whose outlines he limns in *Great Contemporaries*. Yet England's noble effort and glorious triumph in World War II appear not to have heralded the beginning of another golden age but rather to have been the last gathering together and exertion of the nation's historic resources, gathered together and exerted by a man for whom England's "Past stood ever at his elbow." Who are England's Great Contemporaries today? And who are ours? □

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Irving Kristol



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

by Paul E. Reinken

Let Us Now Praise Natural Monopoly

MONOPOLY in a free enterprise system?

As a toiler in Ma Bell's vineyards, I came to understand this anomaly a good many years ago. So long ago, in fact, that the question would appear anachronistic were it not for recent bureaucratic efforts to turn back the clock and reintroduce competition in the communications business. As a result the question has become timely and pertinent to a new generation of business watchers, consumerists, regulators, and entrepreneurs. The argument for "natural monopolies" is being seriously assaulted, potentially to the public harm, and those of us in the trade who know something about the matter must again state the justifications for it.

The concept that proposes monopoly for certain types of industries is not of recent vintage. It dates back three hundred years in England to the time when Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale observed there were such things as "natural monopolies" as distinguished from other enterprises: businesses "affected with a public interest" (we have since come to call them public utilities). Early in the reign of Queen Victoria, in 1848, English economist John Stuart Mill had this to say about the large number of competing gas and water companies in London: "It is obvious . . . how great an economy would be obtained if London were supplied by a single gas and water company instead of the existing plurality. . . ."

Unfortunately, we in the United States did not adopt the wisdom of Hale and Mill in the early days of the telephone industry. Instead, competing phone companies sprang up all over the country, with resultant chaos. Service was poor and charges were high. Wasteful duplication of plant facilities existed, price wars caused bankruptcy, and the public frequently had to subscribe to the service of two or even three companies in order to talk to all other telephone customers. This meant double or triple telephone bills.

At long last, newly-created state regulatory commissions saw the light and began to regulate rates and quality of service, and the concept of franchising one company to serve a specific geographic area gradually gained acceptance. Since 1934, the Federal Communications Commission has regulated interstate communications in much the same way. Regulation developed as a substitute for competition, designed to prevent the abuses which monopoly might create. The process has worked well.

It demonstrated that competition—even though still the cornerstone of our economic system—is not always in the public interest. Some industries, utilities chiefly, operate more efficiently and economically as regulated monopolies. The public gets better service at lower prices. Costly, inefficient duplication of facilities is avoided.

Amazingly, after all our progress, some regulators now seem bent on ignoring the lesson of history and reversing its course. In the last few years the FCC has embarked on a program of competition for competition's sake, with no thorough examination yet as to whether such an undertaking is in the public interest.

To be sure, nobody is trying to compete with the seventeen-hundred-odd telephone companies in the provision of basic telephone service. But the Commission is seeking to promote competition in the equipment market and in the provision of private line service to business customers who want leased lines instead of or in addition to regular telephone service. The FCC has ruled that customers can provide their own equipment—switchboards, push button switching systems and the like—for attachment (with a telephone-company-supplied interface or protective device) to the nationwide telephone network. It also said that new, specialized common carriers can build intercity private lines systems parallel to the established facilities of the telephone companies.

Experience to date shows that this is not real competition, but an arbitrary allocation of the market—contrived competition. Our new competitors want no real competition. They want the right to skim off the dollars in high-profit communications items, but with FCC protection against Bell's counter-competition. This may benefit a few people—some large users, manufacturers and importers of equipment, and the new carriers—but it will be the average telephone user who will pay for these experiments in competition by receiving costlier and poorer service.

Why? Because the loss in these revenues will have to be made up by higher charges to the average telephone customer, and our reasonable price for basic service, which has enabled 93 percent of all households to have telephones, will become less reasonable. And because the quality of our service is being undermined by fragmenting our responsibility for the proper installation, operation, maintenance, and repair of telephone equipment.

Most troublesome is the fact that to date the FCC has not held hearings or made studies on the consequences of its actions on the average telephone customer. Last April, long after its landmark decisions on competition, and following some urging by members of Congress, the Commission agreed to hold an inquiry into the vital question of the economic impact of competition on consumers. (No mention was made of the service impact.' One can only hope the hearings will be held soon and conducted expeditiously, while there is still time to protect the public's interest in this matter.

Thus far only one quasi-governmental body has dealt with the problem. A study group of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the organization that represents the regulatory agencies of the fifty states, investigated the FCC policies earlier this year and said in part: "The American consumer is going to have to pay more money to keep a telephone in his home because the FCC has put into practice two new policies (interconnection and specialized common carrier) that alter the traditional way of regulating telephone companies so that business users can have cheaper service and reap greater profits."

Bell System studies confirm this forecast. If the telephone companies lose through pseudocompetition the revenue dollars from equipment, long-distance calling, and so forth, basic local service rates might have to double, not even accounting for inflation. That is not a happy prospect for the nation's sixty-five million households with telephone service, particularly the low-income families and those living on fixed incomes.

Along with the adverse economic consequences of contrived competition, to the rate-payer, we at Bell are equally concerned about the long-run threat of poorer service for our customers, if the telephone companies lose "end-to-end" responsibility and accountability for service quality. Studies on the limited amount of customer-provided equipment now connected to the Indiana telephone network show customer trouble report rates twice as high as those where Bell-provided equipment is used. And now the FCC wants to throw the interconnection door wide open through a system of certifying equipment for connection to the network without protective devices. We believe this system would be unworkable and cause serious service deterioration.

Unlike electrical appliances, which simply draw off energy, a telephone puts signals into a complex and delicately balanced network capable of some seven quadrillion possible combinations of telephone connections. If a toaster or television set fails to operate properly, only the user is affected. If a telephone for whatever reason—improper installation, maintenance, or repair—fails to operate properly, it can affect the service of others. It can distort transmission, cause cross-talk (where you hear the conversation of others), and result in wrong numbers and inaccurate bills.

Many experts share our concern over the chain of events which has led the telephone industry from the competitive free-for-all of the early days, through a half century of technological progress, efficiency, and good service, to a mixture of regulation and pseudocompetition. In an article in *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, Edward P. Larkin, a member of the New York Public Service Commission, said in part:

"The present regulation of communications in this country was founded on a monopolist philosophy for the sake of economic efficiency. Any departure from

that philosophy—so important to the public interest—should be the result of a national dialogue in depth; not whimsical bureaucratic tinkering that would promote profits for a chosen few. . . .

"In communications, if nowhere else, regulation has been dramatically successful—a marriage between free enterprise and governmental surveillance that has given birth to the best telephone system in the world. But even this obvious truth is challenged by those who would tear down the existing system for reasons which have not been shown to be in the public interest."

This is the crux of the matter. Which course is really in the public interest? Competition which benefits a few? Or preservation of the common carrier principle which has benefited all, regulated monopolies with clear accountability for end-to-end service, and the goal of universal service achieved through sound pricing policies?

Given full information and the opportunity to decide, the public is best able to judge what's in its own best interest. Let the public decide! □

Anthony Harrigan

Schlesinger for the Defense

IN HIS FIRST major address to the Congress, President Gerald Ford placed a very important and necessary emphasis on the need for United States military superiority. "A strong defense is the surest way to peace," the President told the nation. "Weakness invites war, as my generation knows from four bitter experiences. Just as America's will for peace is second to none, so will America's strength be second to none." He went on to stress that "We cannot rely on the forebearance of others to protect this nation. The power and diversity of the armed forces, the resolve of our fellow citizens, the flexibility in our command to navigate international waters that remain troubled—all are essential to our security." All this is in refreshing contrast to the presidential messages during the final phase of the Nixon era, when the nation's Commander in Chief repeatedly insisted that a new era of peace had begun—an insistence that rang hollow in view of the massive Soviet arms buildup and the proliferation of conflicts throughout the world. Certainly, President Ford's emphasis on the need for American military strength "second to none" is a world away from Dr. Henry Kissinger's comment at a White House congressional briefing on June 15, 1972: "An attempt to gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating."

Let us hope that President Ford will not back away from this ringing endorsement of a strong national defense. The likelihood that he will not is enhanced by his retention of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. Since he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on July 2, 1973, Schlesinger has worked hard to arrest the deterioration in America's military position and to develop a new strategic doctrine in accord with the realities of the mid-1970s. Untainted by Watergate and not a part of the highly politicized detente operations of the Nixon Administration, Schlesinger is well-positioned to play a strong role in the Ford Administration. Moreover, he has a unique background for his position as a civilian head of the defense establishment, having served as a professional weapons analyst, assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Opportunities for pushing ahead with revitalization of the nation's armed forces are excellent in the months ahead. Schlesinger recently swore in a new chairman and three new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new senior uniformed military professionals are optimistic about America's military resources and capabilities, whereas at least one of the outgoing service commanders, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., took an extremely pessimistic view of U.S. capabilities. One matter that does give concern to observers of the defense establishment, however, is Schlesinger's reported interference in the selection process for three-star and four-star generals and flag officers. This is a threat to military professionalism and may be a violation of the National Security Act. In any case, such interference is unwise and hurtful. Secretaries of Defense come and go, but the uniformed professionals embody the experience of the services in combat. They have to make the decisions as to which officers are best qualified for high command.

Fortunately, Schlesinger understands the dimensions of the military threat facing the United States. He recently described the Soviet missile buildup as being "staggering in size and depth." He combines this understanding with a determination to find new ways to augment American military power.

In speeches and testimony before Congress, Schlesinger has stressed the increases in Soviet missile forces, ground combat units, and naval formations. He has pointed out to Congress that Soviet military spending has risen by at least 15 percent in real terms over the last few years, while since 1968 American military spending has decreased in real terms by about a third. "We want to avoid undue alarm about these developments," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "But we want to view them prudently."

Schlesinger's prudent response to the growing Soviet missile threat (an estimated 7,000 MIRV warheads on Soviet missiles by the early 1980s as against a projected 1,650 for the United States) has been to devise a new missile-targeting strategy. Last February, he announced that American plans now involve aiming some long-range missiles at Soviet military targets and not just at cities. "We should match the Soviet counterforce capability," he said, urging the development of more accurate and powerful missiles. "The change in targeting," he explained, "simply means that we organize ourselves to develop the doctrine and plans by which we can introduce selectivity and flexibility in the types of targets struck in something short of an all-out war."

Put simply, what Schlesinger recommended is that the United States be in a position to hit Soviet missile forces, if the need arises. In years past, the United States had no need for such a counterforce capability. We possessed overwhelming missile superiority at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example. In that year, the United States had four intercontinental ballistic missiles for every Soviet ICBM. American forces also had twice as many submarine-borne missiles. The United States had 600 heavy bombers compared with 150 bombers in the Soviet air fleet.

There has been a complete changeabout. During the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, America's strategic power declined alarmingly. And in the SALT I agreement, Secretary of State Kissinger accepted Soviet military superiority—in an agreement giving the Soviets 1,618 ICBMs to 1,054 for the United States. SALT I also provided for 950 submarine-launched missiles for the Soviets and 710 for the Americans. The five-year freeze was supposed to persuade the Soviets to halt their missile buildup. Instead, the Soviets have pushed new weapons development and deployment on a wide front. The new cold-launch "pop-up" technique will enable the USSR to replace their single-warhead SS-11 missiles with four to six MIRV-warhead SSX-19s, within the silo limits of SALT I. By this and other developments, the USSR is gaining a significant new military capability and wiping out the qualitative advantage proponents of SALT I thought the United States would enjoy through the 1970s. This, in brief, is why Schlesinger is so intent upon creating a force capable of striking Soviet missile forces. Indeed the United States must push for new missile weapons advances, including a missile warhead that can be maneuvered in flight.

The Schlesinger plan does not envision an all-out first-strike capability for the United States but a hedge against growing Soviet missile power. Retargeting American missiles would impose a new restraint on Soviet leaders tempted to order a powerful first punch.

Arthur G.B. Metcalf, chairman of *Strategic Review*, has correctly described the Schlesinger missile policy as one of the first sure steps "in the direction of national

security and world peace taken in a long, long while." What Schlesinger has done, in announcing missile retargeting, is to set aside a strategic force policy left over from the 1950s and 1960s when America had overwhelming military superiority.

As America makes this long overdue change in its strategic policy it is appropriate to recall the tragically mistaken words of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who said in 1965 that "the Soviets have decided to accept permanent strategic inferiority to the United States, and it therefore is no longer necessary for the U.S. to expand our strategic forces." In plain language, Mr. McNamara almost ruined us.

Unfortunately, the opponents of American strategic innovation are still with us. Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R.-Mass.) has termed the Schlesinger missile retargeting goal "a drastic and dangerous change" in American nuclear strategy. Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-N.H.) has argued that the counterforce capability goal is "destabilizing"—an "in" word for something bad. And Charles W. Yost, former United States ambassador to the United Nations, recently wrote in the *Christian Science Monitor*: "Does 'strategic superiority' or even 'equivalence' have any practical value aside from bolstering national machismo?" NAT Yost would have the United States phase out its land-based missiles and stop considering "theoretical worst cases" in making strategic estimates.

President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger will need to mobilize broad-scale public support for renewed defense forces. The know-nothing and radical elements are busily at work trying to downgrade the need for modernization of American defenses. Thus the *New York Review of Books*, which plugged Hanoi's cause so hard in the 1960s, now is hitting hard against strengthening America's defenses. In a lengthy review last June of Schlesinger's report to Congress on the Fiscal Year 1975 defense budget, the Review said: "The word used to frighten people about Russian ICBMs is their 'throw weight,' that is to say, the size of the warhead they are capable of releasing. *Russian missiles are not nearly as accurate as their American counterparts and thus need copious throw weight to produce sufficiently large explosions to compensate*" (Italics added for emphasis).

What the know-nothings and the radicals refuse to consider is why a democratic nation with free institutions and with a gross national product of $1,073 billion (USA, 1971) should accept military superiority or even parity on the part of an aggressive, totalitarian regime with a GNP of only $330 billion (USSR, 1971).

Moreover, to answer those who say America can live with strategic parity, we should recall the words of Coral Bell in her book, *Conventions of Crisis*: "Peace is not best guaranteed by an equilibrium of power; it is best guaranteed by an assured preponderance on the side of the status quo."

President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger not only have the nuclear-missile realities to consider in reshaping American strategy and force levels, but have to deal with the extraordinary changes in national power and ranking—plus alliance relationships—that will result from the soaring cost of oil. Americans have not yet really begun to analyze the extent to which the high cost of oil from the Arab states will alter the status of many nations. Inevitably, the United States will have to revise its alliance system as certain associated countries in Europe and elsewhere are brought to bankruptcy or near collapse by the staggering cost of fuel.

The Western countries—at long last—are paying the truly horrendous cost of hasty, ill-considered decolonization. Virtually all the oil-rich lands were under Western control or influence in the early 1950s when the NATO alliance was established. How different the situation of Western Europe would be if Italy still controlled Libya, if France were still established in Algeria, and if Britain still maintained her influence over the Persian Gulf region. At the moment, that is the spilt milk of history.

Today, a vast transfer of wealth is under way, with billions of dollars flowing from Europe to the Arab oil-producing nations of the Middle East and North Africa. This may be the greatest transfer of wealth in history. The Arab nations are picking up between $5 billion and $6 billion a month in additional oil revenue, and the European countries are running deficits in that amount. It seems only a matter of time—and very little time at that—before the weakest European countries (Italy, for example) are bankrupt. England cannot be far behind. Portugal has abandoned strategic Mozambique on the Indian Ocean. At this writing, the fate of Angola, with its rich oil field and valuable mineral deposits, is uncertain. But the impoverishment of Portugal as a result of a burst of revolutionary excess seems inevitable. Add to this distressing situation the fierce renewed enmity between the Greeks and Turks, and the impending breakdown of the NATO alliance in southern Europe is very clear. With North Africa in hostile hands and the weak countries of southern Europe plagued by leftist fervor, labor chaos, inflation, and a crushing oil cost problem, the rationale for continued deployment of the United States Sixth Fleet in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean will require the closest examination. It may be that the United States should markedly alter its naval deployments, assigning a sizeable portion of the Sixth Fleet to the Indian Ocean.

The grim prospect is that Arab insistence on a high price for their oil may do to Western Europe—to the weaker NATO countries—what the Soviet Union failed to do in more than a quarter century of political maneuvering and military threat. Elsewhere on the globe, the effects of the oil price will be no less disturbing. All the evidence points to a widespread breakdown of public order in India within a few years, despite that country's emergence as a nuclear power. The poor countries of Central and South America are no less vulnerable to the oil cost pressure than the countries of Europe. And Japan, for all its postwar wealth and vast industrial machine, is reeling under new oil costs—$15 billion a year—which threaten its competitive edge.

These global economic factors have to be cranked into American military policy. They suggest a further, accelerated decline of NATO, except for the vigorous German component; a coming redeployment of American military manpower (300,000 plus) from Europe; increased emphasis on nuclear-powered naval construction and on seapower generally; establishment of closer defense ties with the one Persian Gulf oil-producing nation that wants to cooperate closely with the United States, namely Iran; construction of naval and air bases in the Indian Ocean along the oil route, possibly including ship repair and aircraft landing rights at the Cape of Good Hope; and full development of the missile counterforce strategy envisioned by Secretary Schlesinger.

The likelihood is that the United States will be much more alone in the world five or ten years from now. It is also likely that the global economic situation, triggered by oil costs, will push this nation into a variant of the Fortress America posture, with air and sea forces providing a link-up to selected areas vital for America's access to energy and raw materials. The old lines of the post-World War II alliances are almost gone. The nations that once loomed large in our strategic plans and national calculations—Italy, for example—have retreated almost to inconsequence, except for sentimental considerations, while countries like Iran and South Africa, with wealth in oil or minerals respectively, loom as very important factors in our national security. Indeed it is clear that we are moving away from an alliance-support strategy to a resource-control strategy.

The augmented Soviet military power position and the changed ranking of nations due to oil costs are together producing a markedly different world picture than Americans perceived in recent years or than was projected by the Nixon Administration, with its PR emphasis on peace through trade and detente with the Soviet Union.

By a strange happenstance of history, Watergate the change in the world scene became clear just about the time that a political and/or constitutional crisis in the United States resulted in a change in presidents. Thus President Ford cannot simply say, as Lyndon Johnson did after taking office: "Let us continue." It is necessary to do things differently, to view the world in terms of the *new* realities. Secretary Schlesinger, however, is the carryover from the past administration who was the first to see and to articulate the need for a missile strategy appropriate to changed conditions of global power. On the first page of the defense budget he submitted, he quoted the warning of the psalmist: "Where there is no vision the people perish."

Fortunately, Mr. Schlesinger had the vision to see that the former missile-targeting strategy has no relevance to present-day conditions. Now, there must be parallel vision in developing new strategies for deploying air power, sea power, and ground units to protect those routes, areas, and regimes vital for continued American access to energy and materials. Realistic new defense planning will be needed for the nation's conventional forces as nations rise and fall in the era of fierce struggle over fuel. As the world order changes, President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger will have to convey their perceptions of the new strategic situation promptly to the American people. The candor and openness the President has promised on domestic issues also will be needed in discussing the life and death issues of national security. □

Adam Meyerson

Norman Podhoretz: An Appreciation

TEN YEARS AGO this month, the University of California came to a halt and a new episode of American melodrama began. In the next seven or eight years, cities would burn, campuses would close, the moral energy which ushered in the sixties would become progressively more hysterical and unbalanced, and the fight against injustice would itself become unjust. A rhetoric of "sensitivity" would emerge among a generation that was itself appallingly insensitive. A rhetorical opposition to "materialism" would cloak the snobbery of parasites who lived very comfortably off the greatest material prosperity yet known to man. And a rhetorical war on "fascism," on repressive "Amerika" with all its Kafkaesque implications, would dominate a movement which at the time posed the greatest totalitarian threat to our nation.

What was frightening about the radical rhetoric of the late sixties and early seventies was not so much the rhetoric itself and its attendant hypocrisies, as the fact that so many persons—many of them influential and well-educated—were seduced, or cowed into acquiescence, by its overtones. This was a time when the front cover of the *New York Review of Books*, America's paramount intellectual journal, could feature instructions for making Molotov cocktails. This was a time when the Ford Foundation, America's largest and most prestigious foundation, could ally itself in the New York City school crisis with militant black separatists. And this was a time when the President's Commission on Campus Unrest could stress the "high ideals" of rebellious students, while buildings burned, classes were disrupted, and speakers were wrenched from podiums.

And so now, as the outrages of the late sixties finally give way to the vapidities of the middle seventies, and as we acquire the distance to look back upon our recent tumults, it is refreshing to come upon the name of Norman Podhoretz. The gurus and hooligans of the sixties often met their just deserts in the pages of *National Review* and other conservative journals. But among traditionally liberal intellectual circles, Norman Podhoretz was one of those few men with the courage to protest the rampages of the New Left, the implications of the counterculture, and the dangers of a conventional wisdom dizzied by their influence. Podhoretz was one of those few sensible men with the courage to uphold American democratic and liberal values —toleration and humaneness, equal economic opportunity, rational discourse, respect for law—at a time when they were seriously threatened.

The discerning lucidity and sharpness of Podhoretz's protest did not emerge primarily in his own words. Indeed, the reader familiar with the brilliance of Podhoretz's literary criticism in the fifties, or with the vigorous insight, for example, of his "Hannah Arendt on Eichmann" of the early sixties, will be disappointed to find his writings of the late sixties and early seventies somehow lacking in his customary spirit and subtlety. No, Podhoretz's contribution to the defense of humane values was rather as an editor, as the organizer of other men's ideas, as the orchestrator of other men's voices. Since 1960 he has been editor of *Commentary*, the prestigious intellectual journal of the American Jewish Committee, and he has distinguished himself not only by his painstaking editing of manuscripts, but also by his perspicacious selection of authors representing a variety of viewpoints. In the polemical debate of the late sixties and early seventies, Podhoretz narrowed the spectrum of those viewpoints, but he selected and actively encouraged a group of perceptive writers expertly equipped to strip the hide from smug conventional wisdom and thereby reveal its ugly bones.

In issue after issue, *Commentary* writers assaulted the rallying cries of the New Left and the counterculture. The Chicago conspiracy trial: Alexander Bickel exposed the hypocrisies of its pious participants and its self-righteous commentators. Reforming criminal justice: James Q. Wilson cast doubts on the effectiveness of rehabilitation and criticized our overweening sympathy for criminals at the expense of their victims. Black Power: Daniel Moynihan compared its symbolic demands with the real economic and social needs of black people. The New Politics: Roger Starr contrasted the sympathy of the Lindsay administration for the poor and the black with its seeming disdain for the middle and working classes. Innovation in the schools: Samuel McCracken denounced the quackery of fashionable but contentless classroom experiments. University turmoil: Robert Nisbet called for a restoration of authority and a return to traditional ideals of scholarship. The list of issues, the list of names, goes on and on.

The *Commentary* critique of conventional wisdom was by no means monolithic, but several fears underlay its diverse prongs of attack, and under Podhoretz's direction, they came together with great forcefulness. One was a fear of anti-Americanism, or more properly, of an antidemocratic elitism directed against the middle-class values of most Americans. Podhoretz was particularly afraid of an "alliance between the patriciate and the underclass against the liberal center," of radical chic, a form of class snobbery masquerading as social commitment. The well-to-do, already secure economically, could scorn the petty materialistic concerns of their bourgeois underlings and look instead to the spontaneous expressiveness of the lumpenproletariat. The well-to-do, secure in their suburbs or heavily-patrolled city neighborhoods, could scorn the anxiety of the working and middle classes over crime in the streets, and sympathize instead with the criminals who also rebelled against Middle America's bland mediocrity.

In the many scurrilous attacks on *Commentary*, magazines *a la mode* such as *Ramparts* accused Podhoretz and his writers of constructing an ideology to defend the economic interests of the "Establishment," particularly the "Jewish Establishment." There is a ring of truth to these criticisms, for *Commentary* came to the defense of values and institutions which had enabled the "Establishment" to prosper. But the overriding concern for Podhoretz and *Commentary*, more so than for many of their radical detractors, was as much to provide the opportunities for those who had not yet made it, as it was to protect the interests of those who already had. Podhoretz's autobiography, entitled *Making It*, shows his own rise as the son of a milkman to a position of some prosperity and of greater fame and influence. It also shows his acceptance, after a phase of intellectual estrangement, of the mainstream of American values and ambitions—the ethic of work and success. Making it was not so bad as many intellectuals pictured it—indeed, beneath their pretensions, intellectuals shared their fellow Americans' ambitions of success and power.

What struck Podhoretz about America was that no other country offered so many opportunities for making it, no other country allowed so many to advance so far and so quickly. But by the late sixties, the commitment to traditional American values like hard work had been replaced by grand posturing about "white racism" or "repressive society." Podhoretz saw the alliance between the well-to-do and the poor as in many ways a sham to protect the social position of those already wealthy. They provided symbolic rather than real responses to social problems, giving money, for example, to the Black Panthers, when what blacks—and most whites too—really needed was to advance their social and economic positions; in other words, blacks needed better jobs, better education, better housing, better protection from crime, and better self-discipline. They did not need moralistic charades.

A second fear motivating Podhoretz and the writers he selected for *Commentary* was of the threat to reason and intellectual discourse. This threat took many forms: the disregard for academic freedom, the preference for moral assertion over reasoned argument, the glorification of "sensitivity" and emotion, the mind-destroying drugs, the violence, the classroom emphasis on social adjustment rather than on skills and knowledge, the prevailing scorn for history and contempt for science, the hysteria. American soil had always nourished a healthy anti-intellectualism, but this latest assault on reason assumed distressing new dimensions, because it was aided, indeed actively encouraged, by intellectuals themselves.

The upper-class patriciate which menaced liberal and rational values allied itself not only with the lumpenproletariat, but also, as Nathan Glazer and other *Commentary* writers pointed out, with prominent intellectuals. The drivel which

passed for conventional wisdom about crime, for instance, was distilled from the work of leading social scientists. Some of the most baneful attacks on America and on a rational discussion of foreign policy oozed from the pen of Noam Chomsky, the founder of modern linguistics, and hardly an upper-class patrician. And at many universities, faculty were often among the most flatulent prophets of destruction. Podhoretz saw the greatest threat to intellectual life arising from within the intellectual community itself, and article after article in *Commentary* stung the forces of self-hatred as well as of hatred.

Although many of its contributors are not Jewish, *Commentary* is a Jewish publication, and the third major fear guiding its articles during this period was of nascent anti-Semitism. Jews have fared best where liberal and intellectual values prevail, and in America they have thrived in greater numbers than anywhere else in modern times. But now that the ideals of liberal tolerance, of the work ethic, of rational discourse, were crumbling before vicious attacks from the Left, Podhoretz and some of his writers perceived ominous threats to Jewish life. On the one hand, the values which protected Jewish culture in America were disintegrating. On the other hand, anti-Semitism was reviving as many radicals singled out Jews as the archetypal representatives of rational and bourgeois culture. In 1967, when Israel's very existence as a state was threatened again, *Commentary* articles warned of the dangerous implications portended by the fatuous but widespread radical manifestoes against "Zionist imperialism." In the New York City school crisis of 1968 and 1969, Earl Raab and others warned that the calls for community control and decentralization masked an emerging black anti-Semitism. And just as Podhoretz and some of his writers feared the threat to the intellectual community from within, so they argued that the greatest expositors of anti-Semitism were Jews themselves, and that some Jews, especially some Jewish intellectuals, with their virulent anti-Americanism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-Semitism, menaced everything *Commentary* and Judaism stood for.

Podhoretz's decision to turn against the New Left and the counterculture was a difficult one, for he had always been very sympathetic to the Left's moral energy. As late as 1968, in an article for *Harper's*, Podhoretz had chided another critic of the New Left, George Kennan, for failing to balance his disapproval of its excesses with an appreciation of the virtues of its moral temper and its insistence that justice be done. Podhoretz believed there were real injustices in race relations and in our Vietnam policy, and he thought the radical movements were performing a service by pointing them out. As the sixties moved onward, the moral temper became more and more threatening as it became more and more hysterical, but the real injustices of American life continued and it was with some discomfort that *Commentary* articles during this period increasingly lashed out at the dangers of moralism.

The turn against leftism must have been additionally painful, because Podhoretz was a liberal, long partial to the Left and its intellectual bases. Upon taking editorship, Podhoretz had consciously changed the direction of *Commentary*, moving from a strong anticommunism that had rationalized, if not encouraged, McCarthyism, to a more moderate anticommunism. Under his editorship, *Commentary* had crusaded energetically for the civil rights and later for the economic rights of blacks. Under his editorship, *Commentary* published many writers whose thoughts would later have great influence on the rhetoric of the late sixties: Paul Goodman, for example, or Edgar Friedenberg, or Herbert Marcuse. And under his editorship, even as the excesses of rebellion were crippling North America, *Commentary* published articles sympathetic to revolutionary movements in Latin America.

In his autobiography Podhoretz admitted the importance of status and approval in his and other New York intellectuals' lives, and other New York intellectuals dismissed him for being petty. But for someone supposedly petty, Podhoretz had the great courage to risk the popularity he so coveted, in taking his stands of the last few years. Henceforth, he would be kicked around not only by the Right but also by most of the Left, and by many of his closest friends. Jason Epstein, publisher of the *New York Review*, and once Podhoretz's best friend, reportedly never speaks to him any more, and publicly accused him of returning *Commentary* to its days of rationalizing McCarthyism.

Of all the indignities Podhoretz has suffered recently in the intellectual press, few were so cruel or further from the truth. Podhoretz continued to disrelish McCarthyism, but he saw that the major threats to democratic and intellectual values now came from the Left rather than from the Right. Podhoretz continued to battle for civil rights and economic rights, for all people, but he was opposed by movements which cared neither for civil nor for economic rights. And in an age of rhetoric against "fascism," Podhoretz, who understood the fanaticism of real Nazi anti-Semitism, saw the real threat of fascism as coming from those who declaimed against it so fanatically.

Today the flames of our recent past have subsided. The threat to liberal and intellectual values persists—now in the form of neo-Malthusianism and mindless egalitarianism—and *Commentary* continues to point out their dangers. But the threat to these values is less violent and less immediate than it was several years ago, and the public discourse is slightly more reflective. Perhaps our mood is changing, perhaps as we look back now upon the late sixties and early seventies we shall better understand the assault on our values and institutions during that period, and perhaps we shall better appreciate those who defended them. This spring, the Catholic intellectual journal *Commonweal* asked, somewhat in disbelief, "Shall We Soon Praise Podhoretz?" I hope that we shall. □

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Myron Lieberman

Watergate: The Bottom Line

WHAT DIFFERENCE will Watergate make? When the last criminal has been jailed or pardoned, the last column written, the last politician elected or defeated on the basis of a position on Watergate, what will be the "net effects" of the complex of events called Watergate?

My thesis is that the bottom line will be negative: the overall impact of Watergate will be to weaken this country and its chances for achieving a more stable and democratic society. In saying this, I recognize that Watergate will have desirable as well as undesirable consequences. For example, investigation and prosecution of suspected criminals should help to clean up government and to build up our faith in an effective system of justice. But I fear that deleterious consequences will outweigh such beneficial ones.

Why am I so pessimistic? Let me first illustrate the argument before stating it, using an example from the field of education. States guarantee a huge market for those textbooks which they adopt for their school systems, so getting on the state adoption list is extremely important to publishers. Not surprisingly, bribery to achieve this result became common practice in some states; it often became so flagrant that in addition to prosecuting the bribe givers and takers, some state legislatures removed textbook adoptions from the state education departments by creating independent state textbook commissions for the sole purpose of deciding which textbooks should be adopted.

The establishment of these textbook commissions, however, turned out to be an inadequate institutional response, and some were subsequently abolished for this reason. The selection of instructional materials is often the most important decision about a curriculum made by school officials, but those states which wanted to add, eliminate, or modify curricula found it difficult to do so when the agency which controlled the selection of instructional materials was independent of the agency responsible for curriculum policy. One would hardly make physicians responsible for medical treatment while according others the legal right to prescribe the drugs to be used by physicians, but independent textbook commissions institutionalized such inconsistencies in the field of education. (Obviously, opposition to institutionalizing divided responsibility does not mean that it was wrong to prosecute those who offered or accepted bribes for adopting textbooks.)

In must the same way, our institutional response (or nonresponse) to Watergate has been a disaster thus far. The institutional changes being advocated, like the independent textbook commissions discussed above, are likely to do more harm than good in the long run. And those that are called for are not even being discussed, let alone advocated.

For example, many persons think Watergate demonstrates the need to weaken presidential control over the federal bureaucracies. The reasons for these views are clear enough. The available evidence indicates that efforts were made to use the IRS to harass opponents of the Administration and to provide favorable tax rulings for Administration supporters or donors to Administration-controlled campaign funds. Similarly, it appears that efforts were made to use the CIA to support a coverup of the Ellsberg break-in and illegal campaign contributions. These and similar incidents have evoked a flood of comment on the "imperial presidency." Some have portrayed the bureaucracies as heroic defenders of truth and justice, bravely resisting an administration determined to use it for illegal purposes.

The President and his Bureaucrats

Now the abuses mentioned above are extremely serious ones which cannot be accepted or condoned. And unlimited presidential control over the bureaucracies, or even greater control over them than presidents now have, would present some dangers. Nevertheless, the major problem now is *insufficient* rather than overwhelming presidential control over them. To see why this is so, we need to see the problem of presidential control in its proper perspective.

Suppose an elected president could appoint only his secretary, whereas all other government officials held office regardless of who was elected. In this case, election of a president would obviously not mean very much. Unless our elected officials can choose, control, and direct their subordinates down to some significant level, they will be helpless to introduce or manage the policy changes which they were elected to carry out. The issue is not simply, or even primarily, the right of elected officials to control their subordinates. Unless the authority and control of elected officials permeates downward to a significant, though not unrestricted, degree, the right and capability of our people to run their government is lost.

Both domination of elected officials by bureaucracies and attempts to subvert bureaucracies to illegal purposes are serious problems, but at present the former is more destructive: the federal bureaucracy exercises far too much control over elected officials and their policy-making and managerial appointees. I recognize this is debatable; many persons are not even aware that bureaucratic domination is a problem at all. Indeed, this is part of the problem. The media can have a field day with alleged presidential subversion of a federal agency. At the same time, where and how does our society learn about the pervasive dependence of elected officials upon the bureaucracies for information, for formulation of policy options, for implementation of policies? How do we learn about the ability of federal bureaucracies to frustrate presidents, not simply on illegal requests but on matters of public policy which are perceived as threatening to the bureaucracies?

One hears much of presidential secrecy, very little about the conditions that render it imperative. Does anyone suppose that President Nixon could have taken the military and state departments into his confidence concerning the opening to China, and not been sabotaged in a hundred different ways by those in these bureaucracies and the armed forces opposed to such a development? Bureaucrats have frequently sabotaged domestic as well as foreign initiatives; their power over elected officials is not confined to national security issues. In part, it is not "natural security" but accountable representative government that is at stake in the conflict over the power of elected officials to control their subordinates. This power, much too weak before Watergate, is likely to be further weakened by media preoccupation with alleged abuses of presidential power, and a continuation of its historic neglect of abuses of bureaucratic power.

For instance, what are we to make of the tendency to criticize the president for appointing "colorless technicians" instead of policy makers who resign in principle or fight the president openly, or politicians with a constituency of their own? One problem is that government cannot be conducted either for the convenience of the media or pursuant to the commandments of media columnists, commentators, and/or reporters. The media do not simply report disagreements between high officials, dramatic resignations, and high level conflict. They encourage, magnify, and thrive upon these developments. On the other hand, the president is our only elected executive officer, and regardless of party, the president cannot run the government unless he can appoint and control his subordinates. This is no justification for giving or carrying out illegal directions, but media criticisms of the president's allegedly tight control over his subordinates are clearly not limited to illegal activities. The same persons who now assert that Nixon was responsible for the malfeasance of his subordinates, regardless of his knowledge thereof, were also criticizing him before Watergate for allegedly keeping too strong a control over them. Of course, these critics have no monopoly over inconsistency, but their criticisms are unjustified all the same.

The extent of presidential delegation of authority should be seen as a presidential, i.e., a managerial decision. Those elected leaders who want to delegate authority and/or to appoint political opponents, or to rely upon politicians with independent constituencies, should be free to do so. Such appointments are probably due to inability to get nominated and elected without deals; regardless, tolerating opposition from subordinates is hardly superior in principle to the view that the person constitutionally chosen to run the government has to exercise effective control over his subordinates to do so, and is therefore under no moral or public policy compul-

sion to appoint or rely upon opponents, actual or potential, to run the government. The notion that there is such an obligation is more consistent with anarchy than with accountable representative government.

The Demise of Party Government

My next point is that Watergate is weakening the role of political parties and of the two-party system in the United States. I am not referring to the adverse political impact of Watergate on the Republican Party, which might be viewed as a logical response to that party's responsibility for Watergate. I believe that Watergate is accelerating the decline of *both* parties as a means of making public policy. All four state-wide candidates endorsed by the New York State *Democratic* Party lost in the September primaries, in some cases by overwhelming margins. Theoretically, the electorate could believe strongly in the two-party system but nevertheless express its dissatisfaction with one at a given time by repudiating it thoroughly in various elections. Unfortunately, we are witnessing something more basic and more threatening than the temporary decline of one party.

Evidence of the weakening of the role of both political parties comes from many sources. Recent public opinion polls show the lowest level of party identification in recent history. At the same time, there has been increasing support of, and resort to, nonparty means of bringing about political action. The emergence of Common Cause, Nader's Raiders, and "public interest" law firms are illustrations. For all practical purposes, these organizations lack political responsibility. Their leadership is not accountable in any realistic way even to their own membership, which can enjoy the satisfaction of being public-spirited and above politics while undermining what is left of party activity and influence.

If our political parties are unrepresentative and unresponsive, let us make them representative, responsive, and accountable. But let us not create a new oligarchical authoritarian structure outside of parties to bring about reforms, regardless of whether such reforms may be desirable on their merits.

Let me emphasize that I am not questioning anyone's legal or moral right to advocate or participate in activities such as Common Cause. My only contention here is that their effect is to further weaken the position of political parties in our society, and this effect, whether intended or not, is likely to outweigh whatever benefits they bring about. Of course, the Republican Party itself is partly responsible for this unfortunate development; in its efforts to avoid the political fallout from Watergate, it is inadvertantly weakening the concept of party responsibility generally. If one believes in the importance of a two-party system—as I do—shortcomings in either party should not be viewed as a reason to abandon party politics but as all the more reason to become active in a party to improve it.

The erosion of support for both major political parties does not necessarily follow from Watergate, but rather from some false assumptions about the significance of Watergate and of its implications for political parties. Even if the Republican Party had been actively involved in the illegal and unethical activities (which it was not) and even if the electorate were fully justified in repudiating all Republican candidates (which it is not) it would not follow logically or be in the public interest to weaken the two-party system. Nevertheless, although it is not the only contributing factor, Watergate is having this effect.

Tax Disclosure and the Media

I am also afraid that the controversy over President Nixon's tax records will have unfortunate consequences. Since the law providing for deductions for papers of historical interest has been repealed, conservatives and liberals alike seem to believe that what remains to be done is to force back payment plus interest, and prosecute for tax evasion if the facts so warrant. However, from the standpoint of institutional change, the situation has been a complete washout thus far, even though Nixon's tax records have provided the greatest political opportunity in decades to generate support for tax reform.

As a matter of fact, one could hardly hope for a better example of the need to make all (or nearly all) tax returns public information. And although my basic argument does not depend upon support for this particular reform, it is an example of the kind of institutional change which might have been generated by Watergate, but which is not even being discussed.

Perhaps the saddest aspect of the situation pertaining to Nixon's tax returns is the way it has been described and interpreted: the prevailing view is that disclosure, if required at all, should be required only of public officials or candidates for public office. For example, the *New York Times* has asked for income tax information from all major candidates in the tri-state area. Although some candidates complied, or stated their intention of doing so, Senator James Buckley did not. Buckley's response to the *Times* pointed out that those who work for the *Times* have a much greater influence on public policy than most Congressmen; therefore, Buckley went on, all those whose names appear on the masthead of the *Times* should disclose their net worth and income.

In my view, the tragedy is that Senator Buckley was not reallly advocating his own argument seriously. If he had, he would not have limited the request to those whose names appeared on the *Times* masthead. There is not the slightest question that reporters on the *Times* are sometimes influenced by personal financial considerations in deciding what to write, and how. Nor is there any question that full financial disclosure, down to and including the reporter level, would significantly reduce such abuses, which are every bit as dangerous to our society as conflicts of interest affecting politicians. No, the real tragedy of Senator Buckley's response is that it was offered as a forensic rebuttal, not as a serious proposal to be advocated and legislated. Of course, if the proposal were taken seriously, it would be recognized immediately that it should apply to TV and radio personnel, and others who control the flow of information and opinion to their fellow citizens. It would be an enormous step forward if media personnel were required to make full income disclosures both as a professional obligation and as a term or condition of employment.

In practice, there appears to be no movement in this direction. The upshot is that the media, always so quick to emphasize the public's right to know, continues to frustrate the public's access to information that would eliminate or reduce major conflicts of interest affecting media personnel. This point extends far beyond private compensation by political figures. The opportunities for manipulation of "news" for private gain by media personnel are so pervasive, and so bereft of any realistic checks or constraints, that it would be necessary to assume their sainthood to avoid the conclusion that we are being ripped off every day, not just politically but by plugs masquerading as news. Furthermore, a disclosure requirement would help to end the status of media personnel as the moochers par excellence in our society.

Our Media: The Real Problem

Indeed, the most important negative in the entire Watergate situation is the way it has obscured, and made more difficult to resolve, the need for basic reform in the mass media. The incompetence of the media to understand our information needs, let alone to fulfill them, may well be the most important domestic problem we have, since it pervades and makes it all but impossible for us to solve the others on a rational basis. The impact of Watergate has instead been to focus attention on the rights of the media and their objectivity. Granted, these are important problems. But they are analyzed and discussed to the virtual exclusion of the competence of media personnel and of their effectiveness in identifying and fulfilling the information needs of the American people.

For example, what information do we need to make and monitor public policy and to evaluate political candidates and programs? The media play an enormous role in answers to this question, but media personnel lack insight into public policy issues or their information requirements and cannot distinguish between the important and the trivial. Competition for readers and viewers has led to an emphasis upon the sensational, the bizarre, the exotic, or the smart-aleck, while simultaneously providing a handy excuse for the avoidance of news that has a bearing upon the daily lives of millions.

Consider the implications of the homage accorded to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, the reporters for the *Washington Post* who are credited with breaking open the Watergate story. If they are responsible for flushing out the truth about Watergate, what can be said of the media, when a vast panorama of illegality at the highest levels of government would apparently have gone unnoticed otherwise? The more one makes Woodward and Bernstein out to be heroes, the more one is forced to question the effectiveness and usefulness of the media generally. After all, if there ever were a place where we have a right to expect the media to function effectively, it ought to be Washington.

Heroism is not to be denigrated, but it is a risky foundation for meeting our information needs. I believe strongly that there never would have been a Watergate (or American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia) if we had alert independent

media personnel, who do not live on the handout and on leaks and who do not allow themselves to be used to mislead the public. A man with a weak heart would hardly boast about his great health merely because he barely survived a heart attack. And yet, after a massive institutional failure to inform us adequately, the media have added insult to injury by proclaiming that Watergate illustrates the vitality of the media.

Day after day, we are exposed to an endless series of claims relating to media rights. They have a right to be present at the bargaining table when public employees are involved, to publish or broadcast material that jeopardizes a fair trial, to question presidents on a timetable of media choosing, always and in every way equating their rights with the public's "right to know." The latter does not extend, of course, to the right to know media sources, the authors of newspaper editorials, or the extent to which the pockets of media personnel have been lined by sources with a vested interest in what is presented as news. Surely the competence of the media is as important as its legal rights. When it comes to voting, we accept the notion that our ability to exercise legal rights effectively is important, but no such question seems to be raised concerning the media.

The absence of political attention to the problem is understandable. The Nixon Administration shared the common political preoccupation with the wrong issue—to wit, are the media for or against us; if they are against, how can we convince people of their bias? In raising this question, the Administration was not particularly concerned about our information needs but about its image in the media. In an effort to solve this problem, it undertook an anti-media campaign which reinforced the neglect of media competence as a public policy problem. The media's own immunity from criticism in the media, and the political hazards of reform—which now more than ever will be interpreted as an attack upon free speech and an attempt to intimidate the media—leave us worse off than we have ever been in this area.

These are some of the reasons why I believe the bottom line on Watergate will be negative. I would be delighted to be mistaken, but see little merit in the argument that it is too early to evaluate the outcome. Things can get worse as well as better. Unless both critics and supporters of the Administration do some hard thinking about the institutional implications of Watergate, its real costs are likely to far exceed the pessimistic conventional estimates offered thus far. □

William H. Nolte

Irrigating the Sahara

Book Review

Serpent in Eden: H.L. Mencken and the South

by Fred Hobson, Jr.
North Carolina $8.95

IN HIS SERPENT IN EDEN, Fred Hobson has written the first full account of Mencken's relations with and influence upon that small army of Southern writers who came of age during the 1920s—the period when the South, intellectually speaking, began to wake from its long postbellum slumber. That Mencken exerted an enormous influence on the region, acting as a kind of midwife to the rebirth of belles-lettres, has long been apparent to literate Americans, but it waited for Hobson to provide us with chapter and verse of the tale. He brings into sharp focus Mencken's numerous comments, both private (in his correspondence with writers) and public (in his newspaper and magazine articles), on what he considered wrong with the South and what he advocated as measures necessary to the correction of those wrongs.

When it appeared in the New York *Evening Mail* in 1917, "The Sahara of the Bozart" caused only a slight stir, but when refurbished and published three years later in book form (in *Prejudices: Second Series*), it caused an uproar throughout the South, the reverberations of which can still be felt from time to time. For example, a copy of *Sahara*, a little magazine of Georgia verse, recently crossed my desk; its editorial column paid tribute to the founder of the Bozart Press, begun in Atlanta in the late 1920s. Fifty years ago Mencken's name was generally coupled with that of General Sherman or with the Antichrist; today he is considered one of the New South's Founding Fathers. How times do change!

When he included the famous essay in his *Chrestomathy* (1949), Mencken noted that it "dates sadly, but I have let it stand as a sort of historical document." He then added, "On the heels of the violent denunciations of the elder Southerners there soon came a favorable response from the more civilized youngsters, and there is reason to believe that my attack had something to do with the revival of Southern letters which followed in the middle 1920s." Something to do with the revival indeed! Mencken was overly modest. For sheer impact upon the whole region, the essay has no rival in all of American literature—and not by miles. And if that impact was more emotional than intellectual, that's only to be expected. Moreover, the thing was a bomb, not a rational analysis—neither in its inordinate praise of the Old South, nor in its denigration of the present, circa 1920.

On the one hand, it is now impossible for us to believe, as Mencken believed at the time (he soon saw his error), that "Down to the middle of the last century, and even beyond, the main hatchery of ideas on this side of the water was across the Potomac bridges." He was too intent upon setting up a contrast between what was once a civilization and what was then a barbarism to bother with the niceties of judicious thought. He exaggerated as much in his praise of the past as he did in his assault on the present—probably more so, in fact. No doubt his aristocratic prejudicies contributed to his overestimation of antebellum society. Moreover, Mencken tended to confuse the Old South with the civilization of northern Virginia.

What gave the essay its shock power was simply his delight in uncovering sham virtues and impaling pretentious and cocksure men on his rhetorical hook. Probably more than any other of his essays, "The Sahara of the Bozart" proves that the best destructive criticism performs a constructive service. It's not the simple truth that sets men free or even causes them to think, but rather the Truth appareled in shocking garments and blown up to epic size. For example, the kind of truth—both undeniable and wildly outlandish—found in the opening paragraph:

"Down there a poet is now almost as rare as an oboe-player, a dry-point etcher or a metaphysician. It is, indeed, amazing to contemplate so vast a vacuity. One thinks of the interstellar spaces, of the colossal reaches of the now mythical ether. Nearly the whole of Europe could be lost in that stupendous region of worn-out farms, shoddy cities and paralyzed cerebrums: one could throw in France, Germany and Italy, and still have room for the British Isles. And yet, for all its size and all its wealth and all the 'progress' it babbles of, it is almost as sterile, artistically, intellectually, culturally, as the Sahara Desert. There are single acres in Europe that house more first-rate men than all the states south of the Potomac; there are probably single square miles in America. If the whole of the late Confederacy were to be engulfed by a tidal wave tomorrow, the effect upon the civilized minority of men in the world would be but little greater than that of a flood on the Yang-tse-kiang."

Though Mencken was certainly not the first writer to attack Southern lethargy and ignorance—one recalls, in particular, the demolition work of Mark Twain—no other writer, before or since, has had such pervasive influence on the region. Indeed, by the middle twenties Mencken had become, as Emily Clark put it, a state of mind, a school of thought. (As editor of the *Reviewer* in Richmond, which she launched just as "The Sahara of the Bozart" made its appearance in 1920, Miss Clark was one of

many Southerners whom Mencken encouraged and helped. The amount of time he devoted to the Rebels—advising them, contributing to their journals, finding other contributors, helping them get books published, advertising them, as it were, in his articles—is frankly amazing.) As Hobson puts it, Mencken and South-baiting were synonymous terms. While he continued his attack on Southern insularity and moralism, and more specifically on the churches of the region (he was fond of remarking that the Ku Klux Klan was "simply the secular arm of these churches"), he insisted that not until the young Southerners entered the fray could there be any hope for the region.

I should point out that Hobson is much less interested in interpreting the material before him, which he has dug out of the various collections of Menckeniana, especially the lode of letters in the New York Public Library, than he is in simply uncovering it and then letting it speak for itself. He is, in other words, much more the scholar than the critic. If the heart of his research has to do with values, or rather the transvaluation of values, he does not himself evaluate—at least not to any extent. I, for one, think that his numerous quotations from letters and articles written by the so-called Fugitives (who later called themselves Agrarians) convict them to a man of pursuing *ignes fatui*. Following the Scopes Trial in 1925 this group, living in and around Nashville, went on the defensive against Mencken and the Menckenites —particularly the group centered around Chapel Hill (and the University of North Carolina), which was then as now one of the truly enlightened places in the South. While various Southern authors—journalists, like Gerald Johnson, Nell Battle Lewis, Julian and Julia Harris, Grover Hall, and, somewhat later, W.J. Cash; fiction writers like T.S. Stribling, Thomas Wolfe, Julia Peterkin, and Frances Newman; and the famous UNC sociologist Howard Odum—agreed with Mencken's views and helped to propagate them, the Nashville group defended the status quo. Donald Davidson, for example, wrote glowing accounts of the "spiritual unity of the South"; and Allen Tate and John Crowe Ransom defended Fundamentalism as a proper and deserving part of the Southern "tradition." In 1934 Tate wrote that Fundamentalism "fortunately still reigns." Mr. Hobson might have offered us some critical appraisal of these groups, but he apparently writes under the theory that one pays one's money and one takes one's choice.

Serpent in Eden is unnecessarily repetitious and too much given to citation (the slender volume contains some 900 footnotes). Nevertheless, Hobson has performed a great service in uncovering the wealth of material on Mencken and the South, and his book is a worthy contribution to the Mencken shelf. □

Harry and Tonto

WHEN I HEAR the words "a warm and moving motion picture" I reach for my revolver, so it was with my revolver by my side that I ventured out into the fall twilight to see *Harry and Tonto*. This latest effort by Paul Mazursky, director of *Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice* and *Blume In Love*, is about an old man and his cat. (Already the revolver is straining in its holster, begging to be used.) It is a terribly mixed-up mishmash, which I kept hoping would succeed, and which has its moments, but which basically falls plummeting to earth one too many times to pick itself up and go on punching.

The story is episodic and as such reveals what is wrong with the movie: it simply tries to be too many things and succeeds at being each, so that it comes across as no consistent thing.

Harry (played by Art Carney) is an old teacher, long widowed, who lives in a condemned building on Morningside Heights, Manhattan. His constant companion is a miserable-looking orange cat named Tonto. As he walks around the neighborhood Harry gossips with the other elderly residents, gets mugged, watches television, and generally seems fairly content with his life.

However, he must leave his building when it is torn down to make way for a garage. (Notice how poor people are never evicted from buildings so that schools or hospitals or parks can be built. Some edifice redolent of the stench of materialism and profit is always the villain.)

He moves in with his son in the Bronx and proceeds to make a fantastic pest of himself. This loveable old Harry tells his daughter-in-law that she should go on a macrobiotic diet and lose a few pounds, he sets his cat loose to scratch his hostess, and he keeps the family up at night.

Soon his daughter-in-law can't stand to have him around and quaintly tells him, "I don't see your other children burning up the telephone wires to ask you to stay with them." With that bit of conviviality ringing in his ears, Harry sets out to find another place to live. However, he gives up after one try and decides to go out to visit his daughter in Chicago.

Now here comes the real loveableness of the old gent. He refuses to let his cat be handled by the bomb searchers at the airport, so he gets on a bus. But his cat will not use the john on the bus, so he gets out of the bus and stands by the side of the road looking mournful for a while. Then the cat runs away and bus must leave without him, so he buys an old car and starts driving across the country, sans driver's license.

He picks up a homely fifteen-year-old hitchhiker who is heading out to a commune in Colorado. As they drive along he talks to her or the cat about his former wife and her death. "Death's easy to take, Tonto," he says. "It's the suffering that hurts." (!) To this bit of homespun confusion he adds the note that "She suffered terribly, Tonto, but she never complained." (Notice how noble old people suffer terribly without complaining. Doesn't that remind you a lot of the old people you know?)

When the fifteen-year-old takes off her clothes in a motel room, Harry is moved to reminisce about his first love, Jessie, a real, honest-to-gosh friend of Isadora Duncan. So the hippie insists that they visit the poor old creature who now lives in a nursing home in Indiana. They find her demented and deranged but still in love with the dance. While the hippie watches, misty-eyed, Harry and Jessie waltz around the dayroom with its oblivious residents. Organ music screams in the background.

Other adventures befall them when they get to Chicago. One of Harry's grandsons is there and he runs off with the hippie hitchhiker to the commune. Harry's daughter, bitchily played by Ellen Burstyn, tells Harry that, well, shucks, she guesses she will always love him but she guesses they will always argue.

Since he has given his car to the hitchhiker, Harry now hitchhikes himself. First he is picked up by a health foods salesman who advises him to get plenty of Vitamin F and sells him a blender. Then he is picked up by a beautiful hooker on her way to Las Vegas, who obligingly pulls off the road and gives her services while the background music goes into "Love is a Many Splendored Thing."

When he arrives in Las Vegas, he absent-mindedly starts urinating against the wall of a casino. (You know how cute these old folks are.) When he gets thrown in jail for his peccadillo, he shares a cell with an elderly Indian (played by Chief Dan George) who has the only really funny moments in the show. He is a marvelous deadpan comic and more use should be made of him. By the practice of Indian witchcraft he cures Harry of his bursitis.

Then it's on to Los Angeles, where he is picked up by his other son, Larry Hagman, in a Cadillac convertible. The son is broke and on his way to insanity. Harry charitably offers him money but says he cannot stay with him. "A kid's got to have a life of his

own," he tells Hagman, who obviously should be in mental hospital.

The movie closes on Harry living by the beach in Santa Monica with lots of very good-looking old people. (In fact, the only clear message of the movie is that living in California beats living in New York.)

Harry and Tonto does not know whether it is supposed to be a touchingly realistic drama about growing old or a fantasy story about growing old. The movie has some elements of reality—Harry is extremely crotchety and hard to take, the street scenes in New York are all too grim and true to life. But it also has its fantasy—Harry hitchhiking with his cat, Harry making it with a beautiful hooker outside Las Vegas, Harry finding another cat that looks just like Tonto after Tonto dies.

The movie also does not know whether it is supposed to be funny or sad. A movie can be both, preferably at the same time, but the funny and sad moments here are so discordant that they cannot happily coexist with one another. The movie does not know whether it is a supercilious comment on popular culture, as it sometimes seems to be, or a serious comment on growing old. Jokes about urinating in public places simply do not go well with soliloquies on cancer.

Finally, the movie does not seem to be sure of what statement it wants to make about Harry himself. Harry is a complex person, as everybody is, but since everybody is a complex person, it is not a particularly profound comment to say that someone is complex and can be happy or sad, mean or kind.

Harry lacks a personality, in short. He is simply different things at different times and they do not come together at any point where one can say, "This is what Harry is like." At the end of the movie, I did not feel as if I really knew him.

So the movie is not as "warm" and "human" as all that. It is better than "warm" and "human" in that it shows us pictures of life which are occasionally accurate. But while I suspect that the point of the movie was supposed to be that Harry is a lot more "together" than any of his children, the movie itself, upon close examination, simply falls apart. □

Suzanne C. Cox

Confessions of a Charlatan

Book Review

An American Life: One Man's Road to Watergate

by Jeb Stuart Magruder
Atheneum $10

JEB MAGRUDER has been a good salesman all his life, but he isn't going to have an easy time selling us his book.

Watergate has about as much appeal to the American palate these days as a plate of cold leftovers, and aside from a few juicy tidbits, Magruder offers us little that is new.

In fact, much of the book is just filler. Magruder fails to comprehend his own unimportance if he thinks the reader will be interested in obscure White House memos he wrote or in how he organized the Inaugural.

But let's face it. Jeb needed the money so he hired a professional writer and rushed the book to market, sacrificing substance for expediency.

That's nothing unusual for Jeb Magruder, for he's been rushing things all his life.

Magruder came from a middle-class background, and even though his family led a comfortable existence, Magruder says his mother always pushed him to achieve the wealth and social status his parents never had. He calls her "the greatest influence on my life." Poor mothers, they always take the rap.

So Jeb learned how to get ahead early in life. At age seven—in the summer of '42—he was wangling invitations to visit expensive Cape Cod homes. In high school, he was the classic goody-goody. He made grades by buttering up the teachers, and sought peer-group recognition by running for class president and dating the school's prettiest, most popular cheerleader.

He chose Williams College for its status, but during his freshman year he was shocked to find that he was just another "High School Harry" compared with all the "preppies" who dressed in Ivy League clothes and went out with girls from the "best" schools and the richest families.

So Jeb joined a fraternity and quickly took on the accepted code of dress, behavior, and values. He adopted the accepted code wherever he went—school, the army, the business world, the White House. Jeb never really was his own person. He went along with exactly what everybody else did, even when he knew it was wrong.

"I increasingly realized," he says, "that I had grown up without any firm set of beliefs, except for the business ethic, the success ethic."

He climbed the corporate ladder for eleven years after college, changing jobs five different times. Most of the jobs were good, well-paying jobs, but Jeb was never satisified. He was restless. He wanted something better.

Jeb thought he had seen a "glimpse of something better" when he drove through the gates of San Clemente in 1969 to interview with Bob Haldeman. He describes being struck by the "sheer perfection" of life at the Western White House—the immaculately groomed lawns, the white-coated Filipinos serving drinks, the limousines, helicopters, airplanes, and yes, the golf carts awaiting one's beck and call.

Jeb desperately wanted to become a part of that glamorous world. He wanted it so badly that as he drove out of the gates and back to reality, he remembers that his hands were "trembling."

Gail, his wife, had no desire to move to Washington. Jeb's off-and-on flirtation with politics over the years had put considerable strain on their marriage and family life. But there was little she could do to stop him now.

Jeb's personal ambition was too powerful a force for even his wife or his family to overcome. Years later, the words of an old neighbor and friend would come back to haunt them: "Gail, whatever you do, keep Jeb out of politics."

Jeb resembled many of the young men who came to the White House in those early days of the Nixon Administration. They dressed alike, talked alike, and even walked alike. We used to call it the "Nixon Hop."

Most of them were nothing more than errand boys for Haldeman and Ehrlichman, but they enjoyed the trappings of power —the plush offices, the black limousines, and the dubious honor of eating at the White House mess.

They soon began thinking they had real power, and it took someone like Pat Buchanan to pin Magruder's ears back.

"Damn it," Buchanan shouted when Jeb presented him with an assignment. "I'm sick of Haldeman thinking I'll write junk for him and I'm sick of you new guys coming in here and thinking you're in charge of everything!"

But the problem was that there were not enough men like Buchanan in the White House.

Many of the aides were "new guys," insecure and anxious to prove themselves in the eyes of Haldeman and the President they hardly knew.

They were actually more concerned with making themselves look good than with making the President look good. Access to the Oval Office was the name of the game, and the infighting among aides was intense. One is struck by the contempt Magruder shows for the others he worked with, especially those he viewed as a threat to his own position.

Many of them, like Magruder, had no deep personal loyalty to the President, nor any deep intellectual commitment to the cause they served. Indeed, all that Magruder can tell us about his political ideals is that as a college student, majoring in political science, he tended more toward the conservative ethic. He describes that as "less big government" and "more emphasis on self-reliance." But he repeats these phrases so often that they begin to sound like words he memorized out of a campaign fact book.

One suspects that Magruder's cause was

really no greater than himself. The major reason he went to work for the CRP was not to get Richard Nixon re-elected, but to get himself a better job after the campaign. And the major reason he participated in the cover-up was not to protect Richard Nixon, but to protect Jeb Magruder.

After all, Jeb was deeply involved in Watergate. Liddy worked for him, and Jeb was the one who had gotten Mitchell to approve Liddy's surveillance schemes.

So Magruder had as big a stake as anyone in keeping the whole affair quiet. He volunteered his role in Watergate out of "ambition, loyalty, and self-protection." He was not some unwitting pawn at the mercy of higher-ups.

He could have resigned or objected to what was happening—that would have been the honorable thing to do. But it would have cost Jeb his job. Yet it would not have cost Richard Nixon his election or his Presidency.

It is ironic that Magruder once said he would have preferred to call his book *An American Tragedy*. Theodore Dreiser not only had the title first, he had the character and the plot as well.

Dreiser's Clyde Griffiths was much like Jeb Magruder, an essentially decent young man from modest beginnings who became corrupted by his lust for status and position. Clyde Griffiths destroyed the woman he loved in order to marry a shallow society girl. Jeb Magruder destroyed the President and the cause he served to save his own power and prestige. Both discovered that the success they sought was not worth the price they paid.

So Magruder's tale is not new. The Clyde Griffithses and Jeb Magruders of this world will always be around. It does no good to ask ourselves, as Jeb Magruder does, if his failures do not reflect the failures of our society as a whole. Society will never change. But individuals can change themselves, and Magruder appears to be well on his way back from Watergate. It takes a big man to admit he is wrong.

Jeb says he hopes that other young people going into politics will learn from his "cautionary tale." There is a lesson to be learned, but unfortunately he lapses into thoughtless platitudes like "play the game hard but clean," or "bring to public life the same high standards [you] would apply in private life." Whatever that means.

No, I believe we can learn much better from those who always understood politics in its best sense. Jeb's courtly old mentor on the Watergate Committee is one of those Americans.

According to Senator Sam, there are two basic commandments for anyone entering politics: "The first is that he must be dedicated to the true purpose of government, which is to promote the good of the people. . . . The second is that he must possess the intellectual and moral integrity which is the priceless ingredient of good character. . . ."

In the wake of Watergate, about all one can say is—Amen. □

Wellington J. Griffith III

The Moscow Mooch

Book Review

National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union

by Antony Sutton
Arlington House $8.95

ANTONY SUTTON DEMONSTRATES with impressive documentation that East minus West equals Zero—if I may plagarize the title of another book on trade with the Communist bloc. A research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Sutton persuasively argues that without continuous infusions of Western technology almost since the opening shot of the October Revolution, the Communists could not have waged ceaseless aggression against the free world for half a century. He denies that deathless myth, perpetrated since the Wilson Administration, that Western trade is the economic path to peace with the Communists. On the contrary, he contends, it is economic sanctions that would create peace, simply by disarming the Communists.

Based on available statistics, Sutton estimates that "possibly 95 percent of Soviet military vehicles are produced in very large plants originally designed by American engineers in the 1930s." Further, American companies are currently supplying the machinery for the Kama River complex which will produce more heavy-duty trucks than all American truck manufacturers combined. That same machinery can be used to produce tanks, armored personnel carriers, rocket launchers, and other war materiel.

American companies have built and/or equipped complete Soviet facilities to produce military aircraft, radio communications, explosives, submarines, and motor fuel. Virtually all Soviet computer technology comes from American companies or their Western European subsidiaries. United States firms have also provided blueprints and finished products which add to the Kremlin's arsenal.

The equipment and technology which the West—primarily the United States—ships to Moscow is usually the most advanced. The Communists won't accept second-best. Last year, for example, the Soviet regime signed a contract with two American firms to construct a $100 million petrochemical complex. An elated Communist official noted that the manufacturing process his country bought "is the best in the world."

The Communists acknowledge what our own government has consistently denied, that the United States has constructed most of the enemy's military-industrial complex. According to Averell Harriman, an ambassador to Russia under Roosevelt, Stalin admitted "that about two-thirds of all the large industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union had been built with United States help or technical assistance." That generosity continues to this day, as Sutton proves. Western Europe has also made major contributions to the Soviet arsenal.

The trade myth was first espoused even before the Communists consolidated their power in Russia. According to State Department files, Edwin Gay, a member of America's War Trade Board and the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested in 1918 that "if the people in the Bolshevik sections of Russia were given the opportunity to enjoy improved economic conditions, they would themselves bring about the establishment of a moderate and stable social order." The same argument is used by the present administration. Kenneth Rush, when undersecretary of state, contended that, ". . . greater trade and closer economic relations with the Soviets will be a far more effective liberalizing influence than continued isolation and lack of contact."

Rush is awfully incompetent if he doesn't realize there never has been any economic isolation of the Soviet Union. Even in the 1920s, a decade before Washington recognized the Communist regime, American businessmen, with State Department connivance and approval, were providing the Kremlin with American technology and machinery.

Soviet dissidents, supposedly the beneficiaries of that trade as a liberalizing influence, deny this fantasy. Andrei Sakharov, father of the H-bomb, argues: "The history of the USSR shows that the period of maximum friendship with the USA, the period of Roosevelt . . . was at the same time the period when the dictatorship flourished and bloomed." Some $11 billion in Lend-Lease aid, including billions to rebuild Soviet factories after World War II, did nothing to ameliorate Stalin's murderous paranoia.

The same situation is reappearing today, in parallel with quantum jumps in the flow of American technology to the Soviet Union. Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times*, definitely not a hard-line anti-Communist, asserts that "the growing repression of the Kremlin against the dissidents . . . [has] appeared to in-

Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **Amarcord:** Federico Fellini's magnificent reminiscence of his 1930s boyhood. A lusty, loving, wry, and tender ramble through the four seasons and the many conditions of humankind. No sloppy sentimentality but much sentiment; and no holds barred, yet without the excesses of his most recent retrospective film before this, *Fellini's Roma*. It is a joy throughout.

■ **California Split:** George Segal and Elliott Gould as two gambling freaks, devoted to the tables night and day. Robert Altman's film captures the compulsive spirit of gambling (so I've been told by those who indulge . . .) and the off-hand ease of the dialogue is at times superlative.

■ **Chinatown:** Roman Polanski's dissection of political and business corruption in Los Angeles during the '30s. Jack Nicholson's portrayal of a zealous detective at times overwhelms even Faye Dunaway's beauteous, agonized mystery lady, but the City of Angels nearly outpaces them both.

■ **11 Harrowhouse:** A caper film about diamonds, lots and lots and lots of diamonds, and lots of jejune dialogue interspersed with tidbits of fine acting (by James Mason, John Gielgud, and Trevor Howard, especially), and about as much driving force as a glider in a vacuum tube.

■ **Gone With the Wind:** Lawdy, Ms. Scarlett, I don't know nothin' 'bout birthin' babies—and other *mots justes* from Steve McQueen's aunt Butterfly. Yes, it's back again: the rape of the South, Margaret Mitchell's magnum dud of a book emerged as one of the greatest-loved movies of all time. Leigh, Gable, Atlanta, and a cast of zillions. It reappears every decade or so to remind us of how they used to make magnificent films, and to spirit the little fascists out of hiding, the little fascists who want to censor the film because its portrayals of Negroes don't accord with the 1974 version of Revealed Truths.

■ **Harold and Maude:** Bud Cort and Ruth Gordon as the unlikeliest couple since Colson and Christ, and even more fun. It is a cult film in college towns, and should last the year.

■ **Harry and Tonto:** Art Carney and his cat, voyaging cross country to visit his children and see America. His children are atrocious, his ex-galfriend is a honey although senile, and Carney is splendid.

■ **The Longest Yard:** Burt Reynolds gone from football hero to football fink to stud for hire to inmate, having a hell of a time adjusting. The cons are all dears, give or take a sadist, and the races coexist cheerily when the enemy is the guards' football team. They have a ball; you won't.

■ **Love and Anarchy:** Lina Wertmuller's tough story about a hick from the sticks come to town to assassinate Mussolini. His befriender is the proverbial whore with heart of gold; his new love is another tart, apolitical this time; and his hideout is the most opulently decadent brothel imaginable in 1930s Italia. Heavy stuff, but a powerhouse.

■ **The Promised Land:** Miguel Littin's historical pageant of Chile in the 1930s, of an attempt at socialist revolution in certain regions. The film, socialist realist propaganda churned out last year, when Allendeism was still in flower, rises above the expectable in some moments of great beauty and force. Caricatures of the good guys and the bad, but Chile is lovely, the human drama is effectively portrayed, and the result is another example of the distressing fact that right-wing propaganda is invariably awful and left-wing propaganda sometimes effective.

■ **Scenes from a Marriage:** Ingmar Bergman's seemingly endless investigation of a modern marriage gone sour, distilled from his 300-minute six-part TV series into a massively powerful movie starring the incomparable Liv Ullmann. Claustrophobic in photography; sophisticated, chilling dialogue; a phenomenally fine work.

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crease as relations with the United States improved. . . ." Anatole Shubb, *Washington Post* correspondent in Moscow during the late 1960s, reported that neo-Stalinism was growing right along with East-West trade. And Sutton demonstrates that the Kremlin heated up the war in Vietnam precisely at the same time that the United States began providing the Soviet Union with more technology.

On their own, the Soviets have proved incapable of producing a satisfactory razor blade, let alone an intercontinental rocket. If Soviet ICBMs can strike American targets, it is only because American businessmen, supported by the White House, have sold the Kremlin the necessary guidance systems. In addition, American firms have provided the Soviets with modern computers and the most advanced machinery not available from other countries for manufacturing miniature ball bearings, both of which are vital to the production of ballistic missiles and other military hardware.

Sutton notes that our NATO allies have also added valuable nuts and bolts to the Soviet military machine. The Red merchant marine would never have left the drydocks without Western European, mainly Danish, engines. Sutton has identified about 80 percent of the marine engines in Soviet vessels carrying war materiel to Haiphong. All of them were either built or designed in Western Europe.

American firms helped provide the arms that those vessels transported. Even during America's massive involvement in Vietnam, American businesses sold machinery which permitted Moscow to update truck and tank factories built by Henry Ford Sr. and other transportation executives during the 1930s.

As Sutton says, ". . . successive administrations have committed American soldiers to foreign wars without the resolve to win and obviously in the knowledge that American technical assistance was being provided to both sides in these wars [Korea and Vietnam]." Suspicious people might see conspiracies in it all.

Their suspicion is easily reinforced by official government policy. All trade transactions with the enemy are classified. Obviously Washington, Moscow, and the companies involved know what technology has been transferred to the Communists. The only people who don't know are the general public. If trade were as beneficial to peace as the Administration claims, there is no reason for secrecy. The White House and companies should be eager to tell the public about their contributions to a better world.

In order to justify trade, several administrations have developed variations on the main theme. One claim is that some products are military and some are peaceful and the former, naturally, are not sold to the Communists. (Well, almost never.) In a modern, highly interdependent economy such as the one the West has constructed in the USSR, most "peaceful" goods have military application. The more wheat Washington sells Moscow, for example, the more farmworkers are freed to work in the war industry.

Another variation is that the Communists can get their technology elsewhere so American businessmen might as well get in on the trade bonanza and make an easy dollar. Morally, that's a reprehensible argument. No one suggested during World War II that since Sweden was selling iron ore to Hitler, America should do the same.

Economically, the argument is no sounder. Much of the technology that the Kremlin obtains in Western Europe comes not from indigenous firms but from American subsidiaries. Further, the Kremlin is obsessed with lowering American trade barriers. Obviously, the Soviets are convinced that the United States possesses superior technology.

Finally, the United States could block the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union through its membership in CoCom, an international agency designed to regulate trade with the Communists. According to Sutton, Washington has never employed its veto power. And, says Douglas Dillon, former undersecretary of state: "I can recall no instance in which a country shipped a strategic item to the Soviet bloc against the disapproving vote of a participating member of CoCom." This is another way of admitting that strategic goods are sold to the Communists but the United States does nothing about it.

Despite the official secrecy that shrouds American trade with the enemy, Sutton has managed to assemble sufficient facts to prove that trade has never generated an atmosphere of peace, just the bloody opposite. The Communists depend on East-West trade to feed their eternal appetite for war. □

Letter from a Whig



by C. Bascom Slemp

Conspiracy in America Today

(Washington)—WITH PRESIDENT Ford's absolute and unconditional pardon of Nixon the White House honeymoon with the national news media ended.

After we had the pleasure of watching Mr. Ford on TV taking his daily swim, putting his own English muffins in the White House toaster, and playing what seemed to be one endless game of golf, the initial euphoria surrounding Mr. Ford's ascendancy to the Presidency waned. Not only is the public once again showing dissatisfaction with the state of the union, but the GOP too is coming up with foreboding predictions for the November elections.

GOP officials are once again talking of possibly losing up to forty-five seats in the House of Representatives and two to five seats in the Senate, with prospects for the gubernatorial races equally grim. Senator Bob Dole, the former Republican National Committee Chairman, who is up for reelection in Kansas this year, is locked into a tight battle with Representative William Roy for his Senate seat. Dole had expected Nixon's departure to boost his reelection chances, but Ford's announcement of amnesty for Nixon and the Vietnam draft evaders and deserters, as well as his nomination of Nelson Rockefeller for Vice President, have undermined any potential benefits of the change in the Presidency. In response to a question over whether or not Ford was going to be of any help to his candidacy this year, Dole replied that the actions of the President to date had only hurt him. Republican political strategists generally feel the same way and invitations for Mr. Ford to appear in Congressional campaigns have subsequently declined.

Consumers Struck Blow?

"S. 707 would coronate a Caesar within the Federal bureaucracy. With deference to Shakespeare, we say to other supporters of consumer rights that our support is no less than theirs; that we rise against this Caesar, not because we desire consumer protection less, but because we desire good government more."

Despite the Shakespearean eloquence of the opponents of S. 707 (legislation proposing the creation of an Agency for Consumer Advocacy), supporters of the bill remained unimpressed. The parliamentary battle over this legislation turned out to be one of the closest fought contests during the Ninety-third Congress.

Senator James B. Allen (D.–Ala.) and Senator Sam Ervin (D.–N.C.) led what is commonly called a filibuster (but what the Senate prefers to call "unlimited debate") against S. 707. And although they may not make filibusters like they used to Messers. Ervin and Allen showed that they can use the new-style filibuster just as effectively as the old.

Under the rules and procedures of the Senate, and based on the historic argument that minorities have rights which no majority should be able to override, the Senate requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting to end debate on legislation and to bring a pending question to a vote.

During a 1960 filibuster against a civil rights bill the Senate stayed in session around the clock for 157 hours and 26 minutes, as repeated attempts were made to defeat the ongoing filibuster. In 1957 Senator Strom Thurmond (Democrat switched Republican from South Carolina) held the floor (filibustering) for 24 hours and 18 minutes—an individual endurance record that remains unsurpassed.

But filibusters today are not what they used to be; instead they are more "civilized" and more "educated." Under the accepted code of the new-style filibuster a member does not have to be constantly speaking to delay a vote on a bill. So long as the member filibustering, or a supporter, is on the floor he merely has to signal to the President Pro Tempore (the parliamentary arbiter) that he is ready to oppose any effort directed at bringing up for consideration the legislation to which he is opposed. As a result of this gentlemen's agreement the Senate can go on what is called a "dual track system" in considering legislation. This means that while one bill is being filibustered the Senate does not have to come to a standstill, other legislation can be considered, and a legislative backlog can consequently be avoided.

A filibuster can be broken when sixteen Senators sign a motion to invoke cloture if the subsequent vote on the cloture motion is passed by a two-thirds majority of the Senators present and voting. If the motion is passed no Senator can speak for more than one hour on the question under consideration, and as a result no one Senator can prevent a vote on the legislation from occurring.

Under the "gentleman's agreement" a motion to invoke cloture is usually offered only three times. If supporters of a bill fail on the third motion the legislation is generally tabled until the next session of Congress.

On the consumer protection bill, however, there were an uncommon four votes on a motion to invoke cloture, spanning from July 30 to September 19. The final vote on the motion to invoke cloture was 64 yeas and 34 nays (a margin of just two votes), with only Senators Fulbright and Kennedy not voting.

Proponents of the legislation had been able to persuade the Senate leadership to grant the unusual fourth cloture vote because they were confident that they had the votes to break the filibuster. However their strategy collapsed when Ted Kennedy (D.–Mass.) missed the vote. A Senator who reportedly had promised his vote to the supporters of the bill decided to vote with the opponents of the legislation when Kennedy did not show up for the vote.

What happened to Kennedy? Kennedy claimed that the bells which alert the Senators as to how much time is left on a vote were not functioning correctly. (It would have been the first time in seventeen years that this had happened.)

A less flattering explanation of why the senior Senator from Massachusetts missed the vote was that he had stood chatting with the doorman of the Senate floor expecting to make a grand entrance, and thereby casting the headline-making decisive vote, but that he miscalculated.

Kennedy's cries of outrage led to speculation that an unprecedented fifth cloture vote would be taken. But Ervin, Allen, and other opponents of the legislation (who felt the "gentleman's agreement" was being violated) threatened to revert to the old-style filibuster, thus tieing up the workings of the Senate. Under normal circumstances proponents of the legislation might have accepted the challenge if they had thought they could break the filibuster. Because the Senate is interested in recessing for the November elections, however, and because some members who had voted with the supporters of the legislation would have switched their votes in protest of the behavior of the bill's proponents, a fifth cloture vote was not agreed to. Furthermore no one gave Kennedy's explanation for missing the vote much credence since the time of the vote had been scheduled days in advance.

The proposal for a consumer agency, however, is far from dead. A change in the composition of the Senate, which is to be expected after the November election, will probably enhance the prospects for passage of the legislation in the Ninety-fourth Congress.

The Benedict Arnolds of 1974

When the vote in the House of Representatives was taken to confirm Gerald Rudolph Ford as Vice President of the United States no one listened to Louisiana Democrat Congressman John Rarick's warnings about Ford's ties to that well-known international banker conspiracy—the Bilderbergers. With Rarick recently defeated in a primary contest there is now no one left in the U.S. Congress to carry the banner of warning about this "economic conspiracy" designed to "enslave labor in America." But through the "guidance of the Holy Spirit" and the "God we must trust," efforts are being undertaken "out there in America" to uncover the "invisible enemy." "The average American [might] not believe this [conspiracy exists]," say the Bilderberger critics. "That is why we must work together and allow them to gradually figure it out for themselves by uncovering one cartel and

conspiracy after another, and by utilizing secrecy, secrecy, secrecy, in every story."

The most recent effort to bring the Bilderberger conspiracy to light came during the Rockefeller confirmation hearings for Vice President. Testifying before the Senate Rules Committee, the Liberty Lobby left no skeletons unturned in their efforts to tie Rockefeller to the "Wallenbergs and other billionaire international financiers or their proxies." Some of these proxies include the Senate Banking Committee; William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury; Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. Even Secretary of State Kissinger, blossoming in the garden of his "diplomatic successes," has the "glaring thorn" of the Bilderberger ties sticking in his side.

"Men, if you want your nation to remain free—you better act fast."

Faced with humdrum daily routine, Congressional offices can only delight in hearing from those of their constituents who thrive on the conspiracies we have in America today. Indeed the vast number of them makes one wonder whether the Bavarian Illuminati is not at work. □

The Public Policy

by Peter J. Rusthoven

On the Pardoning of Richard Nixon

ON SEPTEMBER 8TH of this year, President Gerald Ford, in the most publicized gesture of executive clemency in the history of the Republic, issued a complete pardon to Richard Nixon for any and all offenses the former President either did commit or may have committed during his entire time in office. In the days since, Mr. Ford has suffered the wrath of the whole mob of media sophists who expected so much more of him, and the rest of us have been treated to yet another well-orchestrated display of morally alarmed hysteria. *Time* magazine, which only a few weeks earlier had featured Ford's visage on a pair of covers entitled "The Healing Begins" and "Ford on the Move," now shifted gears and presented disapproving cover stories on "The Pardon" and "Ford Under Fire." The phrase "No man should be above the law" enjoyed a renewed burst of popularity that (incredibly) exceeded the homage paid to that concept during the earlier controversy over whether Mr. Nixon should be obligated to turn over his tapes to the special prosecutor. Senator Birch Bayh (D.–Ind.) opined that the President's action spelled the end of "200 years of history and tradition of equal justice for all," an assessment shared, according to the network news, by "large numbers" of "disturbed Americans." The President's own press secretary, Mr. ter Horst, was disturbed enough to resign his post, a gesture which he modestly labelled an "act of conscience," and for which he received lengthy huzzahs and a special award from his fellow journalists for this courageous illustration of the honor of their craft. Pundits everywhere hastened to inform us that "the honeymoon is over," and Mr. Ford, in an effort to salvage his hoped-for "good marriage" with the Congress, was preparing to mount Capitol Hill to field some sharp legislative inquiries about the reasons for his unpopular act.

Now personally, I must confess that all this rather surprised me. Had I known beforehand of the pardon, of course, I would have anticipated that some measure of adverse reaction would be forthcoming. But I would never have predicted that the whole pack in Washington and Cambridge and New York would start baying as loud and as long as they have. This, perhaps, is more indicative of a certain naiveté on my part than of anything else. Nevertheless, the immense pother that has accompanied the pardon of Richard Nixon does strike me as a matter of some significance; and accordingly, an effort to examine the issue with a modicum of perspective seems very much in order.

To begin, there should be no doubt that Mr. Ford possessed the constitutional authority to act as he did. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that "The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." The prerogative granted by this section is complete; it is unambiguous; and (save for the exception of impeachment cases) it is unlimited and unqualified. Those who think this is belaboring the obvious should be informed that at least one federal district judge (perhaps scrambling to join Judge Sirica in the history books) has indicated that he is quite willing to rule on the legality of the pardon. More significantly, though, it is at least a partial answer to all those original folk who keep chanting "No man is above the law" to re-emphasize that the pardon is emphatically an expression (albeit a rarely used one) of the legal process—that it is indeed rooted in the single document that most symbolizes the rule of law in this country.

Of course, most of the sniping over the pardon centers not on its legality, but rather on whether it should have been granted in this particular case. Unfortunately, for all the highly critical public discussion, almost no one has articulated a set of standards that should be brought to bear in determining whether a pardon is appropriate. I think, however, that at least five interrelated factors can be identified as significant in making this determination; and while neither that list nor the discussion that follows is exhaustive, I believe that a legitimate case for the pardon of Richard Nixon can be made on each point.

The first question, which arises due to the timing of this pardon, is whether or not a trial would have accomplished anything. This issue depends in turn on whether important new disclosures are likely to come to light in a criminal prosecution; presumably, there is also some symbolic value, in terms of demonstrating the equality of American justice, in bringing a former President to trial. (Any vengeful pleasure some might take at seeing this particular former President in the dock, I think, can be safely ignored among reasonable people.) On the first point, it seems highly unlikely that any striking new evidence would be forthcoming in a prosecution of Mr. Nixon. His own complicity in the events at issue was as sufficiently and painfully demonstrated as such things need to be in the transcripts released the Monday before his resignation. Moreover, the trials of the ex-President's more prominent subordinates, currently getting under way, should provide a sufficient forum for disclosing any new evidence of a more general nature. The second point is a bit less clear—and indeed, a good many people are bothered not so much by a pardon *per se* as by the fact that the judicial process was not first permitted to run its course. But on balance, it is difficult to see what additional symbolic demonstration of the workings of American justice is truly needed. The fact that Mr. Nixon has been forced to resign the highest office in the land, with all the humiliation, both present and historical, attendant upon that act, should be an eloquent example to all but the densest observer that justice is no respecter of position and power. Thus, a trial of Mr. Nixon would seem to offer relatively little, either substantively or symbolically.

A second factor that should influence a decision on granting a pardon is the degree to which an individual, by virtue of his past contributions, merits special consideration. On this score, Mr. Nixon's case is undoubtedly stronger than that of any previous beneficiary of executive clemency. It is unnecessary here to attempt to compile a definitive list of the former President's accomplishments in some twenty-eight years of public service; it suffices to say that such a list would be both lengthy and, in many respects, highly praiseworthy. Moreover, whatever one's philosophical or political starting point in evaluating Mr. Nixon's public activities, I think that all but the most churlish critics of our thirty-seventh chief executive would concede that he brought to his final office the intelligence, dedication, and sheer effort the position demands. His fatal (and yes, even criminal) mishandling of the issue that led to his

The Bootblack Stand

by George Washington Plunkitt

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at avant-garde bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled What's in It for Me? *Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o* The Alternative, *P.O. Box 877, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.*

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

What the hell are we to do? Tuesday morning old Wilbur is driving around the Jefferson Memorial with a car full of strippers and his lights out. When the cops pull him out of the car his face is bleeding like a ruptured blood vessel, his breath is combustible, and one of the broads leaps into the Tidal Basin. Then along comes some TV cameraman who gets a shot of old Wilbur with his arm around a cop. How the hell can we explain this to the stuffy ignoramuses who have been reelecting the old boy since the McKinley Administration?

Your friend,
Jay Stringfellow
Campaign Director

Dear Mr. Stringfellow:

Frankly I do not understand the lurid pother that the philistines in the media have stirred up over this very unexceptional affair. I take it as an extremely auspicious sign when I hear that Congressmen are again patronizing the arts. Not since the days of Camelot has a Washington solon shown such a lively interest in high culture. I cannot imagine how Mr. Mills' constituents could be displeased. He still wears white socks, does he not? He still orders Moon Pies at *Sans Souci*, does he not? And he still comes forward with the most extravagant boondoggles. So what if he now tries to give a boost to adult *librairies*, genuine art films, and *la danse*? What with the opening of Mr. Hirshhorn's museum, and now with Mr. Mills' active promotion of the Silver Slipper, The Scene, and the career of "the Argentine Firecracker," it seems entirely possible that Washington will soon rival New York as a cultural center.

If your constituents continue to grouse tell them that the Congressman was drunk. Tell them he always drinks when he drives so that if he has an accident he will be relaxed. Or blame the whole thing on Nixon. If you are dissatisfied with these suggestions give Ted Sorensen a call. He is faced with these sorts of difficulties all the time.

—GWP

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

As a woman and as a stripper I have suffered a great deal of distress due to the press' exploitation of my misfortune at the hands of one Wilbur D. Mills. I was never very impressed with the women libbers, but it is apparent from the coverage my misfortune has received in the press that there is a great deal of sexism shown toward women who have chosen stripping for a career.

The press has totally neglected the fact that most strippers have great pride and dignity. I personally would not be caught dead with a Congressman or any other sort of politician. This man Mills misled me—he told me his name was Wilbert—into thinking he was a man of refinement. I thought he was a salesman for the Living Bible. When the gentlemen of the law informed me of his real identity I was so mortified I attempted to have done with myself by leaping into the Tidal Pool. These facts were easily available to the *Washington Post*, but their male chauvinists saw me as a stereotype or something.

Heartbroken,
Fanne Fox, the
Argentine Firecracker

Dear Miss Fox:

My dear, you have been shamelessly deluded by a low rascal indeed. I shall be glad to consult with you privately. How about some evening next month? If you could come by my office I would be glad to show you my collection of campaign buttons.

—GWP

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downfall simply does not wipe all this off the slate. To the degree that anyone who receives a pardon can be said to have earned one, Mr. Nixon qualifies.

Third, there is the issue of mercy, which should take into account the extent to which the individual in question has already been punished for his wrongdoing. President Ford was much impressed by this factor, as evidenced by his oft-quoted (and occasionally derided) language to the effect that Mr. Nixon has "suffered enough." We need not, I think, tarry too long over this point. If there are individuals who can conceive of a more profound, lasting, or fitting punishment than being forced to become the first man in history to resign the Presidency in disgrace, I congratulate them on their imaginatively punitive minds. Personally, I cannot fathom what such a punishment would be. And when in addition one considers (as Mr. Ford clearly did) the physical and emotional difficulties that will accompany Mr. Nixon to his grave, it becomes almost impossible to argue that any additional (albeit more traditional) punitive measures are called for.

The fourth factor to be weighed is the degree of contrition displayed by the wrongdoer. Here, many would contend that Mr. Nixon's case is at its weakest, and to some degree this is true. There has been no explicit admission of criminal liability, and none is likely to be forthcoming. But on the other hand, neither have there been loud protestations of innocence, nor any attempt to encourage the development of the so-called "myth of the martyred President." Moreover, Mr. Nixon's largely ignored statement issued as he accepted the pardon did indeed express both his genuine remorse for the grief he had caused the nation, and the personal guilt he bore as a result. Perhaps more profound displays of *mea culpa* would be appropriate; but I hardly think that Mr. Nixon's possible deficiencies on this score constitute a decisive argument against a grant of clemency.

Finally, there is the whole question of "equal justice"—the argument being that Mr. Nixon should not escape the criminal sanctions imposed on subordinates like John Dean or Charles Colson. Initially, this seems impressive: Dean and Colson, after all, are going to jail, and Mr. Nixon is not. But to make heavy weather of this issue, as so many are doing, is rather superficial. Dean and Colson were not President of the United States; they have not made the contributions to the nation that Mr. Nixon has; and realistically, they have not been subjected to anywhere near the suffering that he has. Justice may be blind, but it is not undiscriminating. Mr. Nixon's case, as I have attempted to demonstrate, is unique. There are factors to be weighed in the scales of equal justice in judging a former President that are simply not present elsewhere.

Now all of this is not to say that the pardon of Richard Nixon is so clearly right that no reasonable person should disagree. Indeed, this author is himself somewhat ambivalent on the issue, both in terms of its timing and its possible impact on more mundane matters such as the 1974 elections. The real point, it seems to me, is that the pardon *is* a perfectly defensible and in many ways appropriate act—and that the virulence of the reaction to it is both indefensible and inappropriate in the extreme. There is, I submit, no clearer illustration of how warped and hysterical our discussion of political events in general, and of the Presidency in particular, has become.

Consider, for example, that even as all the keepers of the nation's conscience are in such a dither over the pardon, Mr. Daniel Ellsberg is flitting about from one campus and talk show to another, cashing in on his illegal revelation of classified material, and all the while being acclaimed as a moral hero for doing so. Or consider the 50,000 young Americans who avoided service in the armed forces during the Vietnam unpleasantness, who are currently developing their more refined theory of civil

disobedience—namely, that one should have the "right" to violate "immoral" laws *without* subjecting himself to punishment. Yet public discussion of Mr. Ford's qualified amnesty proposal among the same people who so abhor granting clemency to Mr. Nixon centers mainly around whether we should exact *any* price from those who deserted—and to date, there has not been a peep from any one of them about whether *these* worthy gentlemen should be "above the law." Meanwhile, Mr. Ford finds himself assailed on all sides for what the good R.E. Tyrrell has described, in the *Wall Street Journal*, as his "untimely venture into Christian charity," and we are told that this one act has cost the President not only his credibility, but (shudder) his "honeymoon" as well. And no one perceives any irony in the situation at all.

It is past time, I think, that we brought back a little perspective to our consideration of such matters. The pardon of Mr. Nixon, important as it is, is simply not the great ethical issue of our times that all this frenzied breast-beating of late would indicate. Nor is the whole Watergate period a trauma equivalent to the Civil War, all talk (including Mr. Ford's) about "binding up the Nation's wounds" notwithstanding. And the President himself is not some tragic hero who started to save us, only to fall victim to that one fatal mistake. I suggest that we could profitably quit indulging this penchant for dramatic themes, and relax a bit. The business of the nation will probably proceed a bit more smoothly if we do, and we will certainly be able to discuss it with more intelligence and equanimity. □

Mary Jo Doyle

Young Man With a Horn

Book Review

Remembering Bix:
A Memoir of the Jazz Age

by Ralph Berton
Harper and Row $10

BIX BEIDERBECKE'S short life was governed by two conflicting drives: the need to gain acceptance from his traditional middle-class German family and the desire to play jazz in a way that it had never been played before. In *Remembering Bix*, Beiderbecke's friend Ralph Berton has woven a beautifully poignant biography around the struggle between these drives.

The conflict was evident even when Bix was a child. Bix was a constant source of aggravation to his family. They were musicians and were pleased when he showed musical talent. Soon, however, they realized that Bix had to do things his own way. He refused to learn to read music and preferred to pick out the complicated tunes by ear. In general, he could not accept the standards which had been laid before him. As one of Bix's teachers, Miss Robinson, remembers, "He was a dreamy little fellow and was happy finding his own niche rather than joining the larger group."

It wasn't until Bix was seventeen and in high school, though, that he finally began to taste the freedom from his family's traditions that he so desperately sought. It was then that he bought his first horn and was on his way to immortality.

The remainder of Bix's twenty-eight years can be seen as a constant pursuit of music and as the struggle to overcome the guilt which he felt for deserting his family's ideals. It can also be seen as the struggle of a shy, tortured young artist at large in the world. Much like Willa Cather's sculptor, Bix was thrown into a world which could neither understand nor appreciate him. Hence he was forced to retreat from that world: "What we have in Bix Beiderbecke is exile."

For Bix, the ultimate retreat was music and booze. He could sit alone in a corner with his horn and a glass of gin and be completely satisfied, totally oblivious to the world around him. "There are certain temperaments that seem to be at home only in that queer inner world. For them that is the real, and what the rest of us call reality is the dreamlike, a glimpsed chaos."

The alienation of the artist has been a common theme in fictional literature, but here biography contributes a vivid real-life example: Bix's day-to-day anguish in attempting to cope with what to him was a foreign society. Perhaps Bix's death best exemplifies his alienation. "For more than a week Bix had lain alone in the dusty furnished flat like an ownerless dog, his life ebbing away, drinking up what was left in a few bottles of bootleg rum and bathtub gin. It didn't occur to him to let anyone know. Possibly he didn't really know himself; almost certainly he didn't care. Essentially he had been dying for a long time."

And so, at twenty-eight, one of the greatest popular musicians of the century was dead. Berton uses as his epigraph a stanza from Robert Frost's famous poem of human decision, "The Road Not Taken": ". . . I shall be telling this with a sigh/ Somewhere ages and ages hence:/ Two roads diverged in a wood, and I/ I took the one less travelled by./ And that has made all the difference."

One must wonder, however, whether Bix ever had a choice between roads, or whether his fate was sealed from the first moment he became aware of the power of a musical note. □

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Current Wisdom

REVISIONIST GEOGRAPHY: William Kunstler, patriot, posits an exciting new conception of America the beautiful:

We live in a sinkhole of a country.

–Bloomington Herald-Telephone
October 15, 1974

AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: During a recent descant on her boyfriend, Hugh Hefner, 44, Barbie Benton rephrases the political thought of the NEW YORK TIMES' editorial page:

Hef is highly intelligent and very political minded. He thinks the Presidency would be a step down from being Hugh Hefner, but he would love to take on the job—if only so he could make this country a moral and wonderful place to live. He thinks there are so many nasty shenanigans going on that we need a good man to go in and clean it up. He'd be a good politician because he like to see everyone happy and he just can't stand the slums. He loves to spend money and would like everyone to have some.

–Family Weekly
September 29, 1974

A PUBLIC SERVICE: The intellectual PROGRESSIVE posts an urgent notification just weeks before hunting season opens throughout this great liberal commonwealth:

Conservationists are not anti-social. Most are at least as sociable as any other group, especially around a campfire. It is true that some like to get away from it all occasionally and to hike and camp where there are fewer people. For this they are called nature nuts, bird-watchers, deep breathers, wind-kissers, leaf-lovers, and bird-and-berry boys.

–The Progressive
October 1974

MESSAGE FROM MORONIA: How to surpass Charles Atlas and become a veritable Chou En-lai, the secret of the world's most enormous health spa, exotic Red China:

Out of shape—but too busy to do anything about it?

Now there's a chance for every busy, harried American to get into shape by exercising only four minutes a day—the Chinese way.

It's all explained in pictures, diagrams and text in the new PARADE book called *The People's Republic of China 4-Minute Exercise Plan*, offered to our readers for only $1.

This handy paperback details just how the Chinese keep slim and healthy with a system of non-strenuous exercises that can be performed anywhere, without special equipment. Follow the step-by-step photos to complete eight separate rhythmic movements that leave you feeling relaxed and exhilarated—but never overstrained or exhausted.

–Parade
Spring 1974

"Whom the gods destroy, they

first make mad" — Euripides

PROGRESS AND CULTURE: Some elegant evidence of racial progress in America, as etched on the refined pages of the TIMES:

When former football hero Jim Brown bared his torso on screen, there were no outraged letters from white women in middle America. At last, the black male could be accepted as a fantasy figure by white moviegoers.

–New York Times
October 6, 1974

TRUE CONFESSIONS: A fascinating glimpse into the incubative conditions of New Age Liberalism:

I am the only child of two harsh and combative personalities who married, seemingly, in order to have a sparring partner always at hand. My parents have had no other consistent or lasting aim in life but to win out over each other in a contest of wills. They still live, vigorous and angry septuagenarians, their ferocity little blunted by age or human respect. My earliest memories—almost my sole memories—are of unending combat, in which I was sometimes an appalled spectator, more often a hopeless negotiator in a war of no quarter, and most often a bystander accused of covert belligerency on behalf of one side or the other, and frequently of both!

–New Republic
June 15, 1974

THE NATURAL FOOD CRAZE: The incomparable PROGRESSIVE essays another of industry's conspiracies against humanity for its enlightened audience—an audience whose children apparently eat dirt, dust, and other unusual delicacies:

Most environmentalists and many other citizens have heard about children either dying or becoming mentally retarded from lead poisoning after eating chips of lead-based paints. A chip of paint the size of a thumbnail, eaten regularly by a child over a period of months, can and does cause such disasters, What most people may not have heard is that dirt and dust along heavily traveled city streets also pose a lead poisoning hazard . . . .

As individual citizens we can guard what our children put into their mouths, use lead-free or low-lead gasoline, and urge government officials to eliminate the lead hazard in dirt and dust as soon as possible. Send them a message: "Get the Lead Out."

—The Progressive
August 1974

ETERNAL VIGILANCE, INC: The indomitable PROGRESSIVE dares to speak out against yet another dangerously right-wing American institution:

With its sights leveled squarely on carrying out the humanitarian battles against disaster, the American Red Cross held its annual convention in Minneapolis a few months ago. Four thousand strong they came, carefully structured from the top down, plans well laid, committee jobs parceled out—a no-hitch convention, as it always is.

–The Progressive
October 1974

POST-FREUDIAN MOONSHINE: The limits of psychotherapy as laid down in the shrink industry's POPULAR MECHANICS:

Psychotherapy is an undefined technique applied to unspecified cases with unpredictable results. For this technique, rigorous training is required.

—Psychology Today
June 1974

HUMANITY UNBOUND: In an intellectual corner of the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE the fabulous and complicated Mr. Farble Wagner, bookbender, answers the query "Do you always go for the same type?":

No, I've been in love with so many. There was this dancer in North Beach. Then I was going out with a psychiatrist. Then I fell in love with a clerk-typist. There was a teacher. Then I had this blue period. That's when I was going around with this sailor. There was something very special about the clerk-typist. She had a fabulous mother.

—San Francisco Chronicle
July 20, 1974

A CHILD'S LOVE: Another precocious Ms. reader spelunks into the depths of metaphysics:

I have made a new friend this year, and we are both for equal rights for women, although if a guy opens the door for us, we would not make a big deal about it.

Of course, being in seventh grade, we each want a boyfriend. In many discussions with our group, the subject of asking a boy to go with you came up. So one day, after my friend had liked a boy for about a month, she decided to ask him to go with her.

He was shocked and did not answer her. I think she was hurt, even though she did not show it much. Then she made a joke out of it.

I wish people would stop joking around. If a guy likes a girl, nobody laughs at him when *he* asks *her* to go with him. But the minute you even suggest turning it around the other way, all you hear are giggles and chortles.

I thought most people felt that at least Love should be equal. Why can a guy show his Love and the girl can't—unless the guy shows it first?

–Ms.
September 1974

Correspondence

To the Editor:

Paul Gottfried's otherwise perceptive review of E.J. Hobsbawm's self-serving biography carelessly accepts its Communist author's characterization of Zionism as Jewish "blood-and-soil nationalism." I am not surprised at Hobsbawm's choice of words. Their stench is quite familiar; we have by now all grown accustomed to Soviet propaganda's treatment of Zionism as synonymous with Nazism. A responsible reviewer, however, might be expected to know that in conditions of prewar Europe, Zionism's "blood-and-soil" was in reality the desire for a plot of land which would avert the spilling of Jewish blood. Events that followed have, alas, proved the Zionists to have been more correct in their prognoses than they would have wanted to be.

Maurice Friedberg
Bloomington, Indiana

To the Editor:

I always thought your magazine came straight out of the Dark Ages. But the Current Wisdom section in your latest issue (November 1974) convinces me otherwise: you really must be throwbacks to the Neanderthals. I have never seen so much unenlightened and sexist mistreatment of women. The "sage of Cherry Hill" was right; if magazines like *The Alternative* are still around, we've still got an awful long way to go.

You might call me a "dumpling," Mr. Tyrrell, but in my book, you are a turkey.

Ms. Susan Katz
Teaneck, New Jersey

To the Editor:

E.C. Pasour's "The Illusion of Common Cause" (October 1974) is up to the high standards of your journal; it edifies and amuses. But it would be much more practical and convincing if problems of national security, of diplomacy and military power, were either exempted or dealt with specifically. The concept of collective choice and the free play of self-interested groups, without the interposition of well-meaning though perhaps mistaken practitioners of the common cause, would lead us, for example, to support Greece rather than Turkey on Cyprus just because more Greeks than Turks happen to have migrated to the United States.

I think Mr. Pasour should face the problems which the application of his principles would entail for national security. This particular dilemma bothered the Founding Fathers and *their* predecessors clear back to Thucydides and Plato.

John W. Bowling
Troy, Alabama

To the Editor:

No matter what one's doubts about David Friedman's political philosophy, I think it is very uncharitable to ignore (as McTiernan did in your October issue) that his is a clear voice in defense of freedom, and that it carries beyond the world of obscure conservative publications.

At a time when this country may be going the way of England we should be thankful that Friedman is heard.

Elliott Banfield
New York, New York

To the Editor:

Walter Berns makes a persuasive case for capital punishment. (October 1974) His analysis combines philosophical sensibility with an acute awareness of human emotions. He argues not only for justice but to preserve that condition we call civilization. Accordingly, I write not to criticize but to inquire.

Not so long ago I served on the jury at a murder trial in my city. A fellow citizen had had his life wiped out, brutally and without warning. We had, facing us in the courtroom, the alleged killer. The policemen who had made the arrest were sure they had caught the perpetrator. So was the district attorney's office, which asked for an indictment. A grand jury found enough evidence to recommend a trial.

The attorneys for the defense agreed that a murder had taken place. However, they argued, their client was innocent. The real killer, they insisted, was still at large. It was true that the accused had not been apprehended standing over his victim, holding the proverbial smoking gun. He was arrested afterward, at another location, and identified by witnesses who might well have been lying.

All of us on the jury were resident New Yorkers who longed for a safer city. None of us had a kind word for the muggers and murderers who maraud our streets. But that was not the issue before us. We had to vote on whether the police had brought in the right person.

Very few murderers are caught in the act. Most convictions come from the weight of circumstantial evidence. Do we want to electrocute even a convicted defendant when there remains that slight possibility that the authorities may have arrested the wrong man?

Andrew Hacker
New York, New York

To the Editor:

A yammerhead writing for *The Alternative*? Outrageous! H.L. must be turning in his grave! Yet that is the only conclusion I can reach after reading Robert McTiernan's review of David Friedman's *The Machinery of Freedom*.

McTiernan's review assumes that unless the government were there to regulate every cook, farmer, and sausage maker in the economy, in the public interest, all food would be adulterated (instead of only our politicians) and snake oil would replace aspirin on pharmacy shelves. Other straw men and Halloween boogiemen (after all, it was the October issue) are foisted on your readers to frighten them from that dread philosophical affliction known as libertarianism. McTiernan in his incisive analysis states "Suppose a parent values his automobile so much more than his child that he arranges with his protection agency to have a car thief followed and captured but not a kidnapper?" Suppose a parent purchases more insurance on his home than on his child. Does that mean the parent values the home more than the child? Is this argument related to the viability of an anarcho-capitalist society? Of course not. But, it is so much easier to pounce on straw men than to analyze 1) What is wrong with current society as seen from a radical capitalist perspective and 2) the suggested remedies.

Ralph Nader has depicted the malfeasance involved in government regulation of industry (even though Nader's solution is more regulation). McTiernan defends the status quo even though airline rates are kept artificially high by FAA edict and while drugs used in Europe to treat heart patients are banned by the FDA in this country. Friedman attacks the status quo in these areas and many others while McTiernan ignores not only Friedman's solution but the existence of any problems in our society at all.

Any valid criticisms McTiernan tries to make are lost in a morass of ad hominems. *The Machinery of Freedom* deserves a rational review and criticism which McTiernan is unable to provide.

Karl E. Peterjohn
Sacramento, California

To the Editor:

I look forward to every issue of your magazine, but especially to your Great American Saloon Series, and Siegfried Weisberger's latest installment (November 1974) warmed the cockles of my heart. I could almost hear H.L. Mencken tinkling the ivories and the bass fiddler playing the Beer Barrel Polka, as I read the article, and of course I had a stein of fine brew in my hand.

Beer-drinking has truly fallen from a great art form to a joyless ritual, and you gentlemen are performing a great service in trying to protect our great saloons and to restore them to their rightful station.

In order to assist in the protection and celebration of great saloons, I have a suggestion which I would like you and your readers to consider. It is all the rage and fashion to lower the drinking age to eighteen across the nation, and I think that doing so is only accelerating the decline of our watering holes. Rather, I think we should listen to the wisdom of our last great president, Harry Truman. When asked what he thought of proposals to lower the voting age to eighteen, Harry snapped back facetiously—but not so facetiously when you really think about it—that the voting age should be raised instead to thirty. This wisdom applies even more to the drinking age, at least in saloons.

In my state, the drinking age recently dropped from twenty-one to eighteen, and what followed was a disaster almost as grave as Prohibition. Immediately, bars were jammed with even more college students and sailors than before. I have no objection to letting these youngsters drink—on the contrary, I encourage them—but please, not in public places. Youngsters, and students especially, have no sense of dignity in drinking—their raucousness is not the same thing as robust good spirits, and their sloppiness is not what Siegfried Weisberger meant when he said you must guzzle beer and not sip it. The situation at our saloons is so awful now that I have been driven to drinking at home.

Dignified drinking is an art form, and like all art forms it is partly the result of instinct, but it is also partly the result of long training. Drinking takes practice, and in my opinion, the unpracticed should not be permitted any further to soil our saloons—the brightest spots of our civilization.

Charles Gallagher
New London, Connecticut

EDITORIAL

(continued from page 4)

side commitments. They work with their books, their typewriters, their private thoughts, and, too often, their fantasies. Their work is creative and free from external authorities. Believing an intellectual's generalizations about work is about as dubious as believing Gore Vidal's generalizations about Mother's Day.

What is more, every sensible person understands that those who polemicize against work are often the very people who become so feverish about alienation, dehumanization, anomie, meaninglessness, and so forth. These esoteric woes are often nothing more than the historic distempers of people who sit on their hands or of people who want to sit on their hands. The relationship to work of these supposedly modern woes was remarked upon by Thomas Carlyle in the 1840s, when he wrote that "Doubt, Desire, Sorrow, Remorse, Indignation, Despair . . . all these like helldogs lie beleaguering the soul of . . . every man: but he bends himself with free valor against his task, and all these are stilled, all these shrink murmuring far off into their caves."

I would not go so far as to say that work alone can cure all that troubles us today. Certainly work would be no more than a mild poultice for the aches and pains of inflation. But a more thoughtful respect for and execution of one's work would certainly have a salubrious effect on many other modern problems, especially the aforementioned distempers of the spirit which we engaud in such sociological and psychological hocus pocus. I do not share the view held by men like Carlyle that work is prayer and that work is sanctifying; but I do know that diligent work, if it brings with it no other blessing, brings an end to boredom, and it is boredom that underlies so many of our national problems. If more Americans would assiduously devote themselves to their labors, I guarantee that the scowls would abscond from their faces, the public discourse would advance from crisis and anguish to flowers and sunshine, and—most wondrous of all—the utopian intellectuals would be unemployed. Let us roll up our sleeves, bend over our workbenches, and put the merchants of misery to flight. □

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